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The rise of the Internet of Things (IoT) has brought with itself an unimaginable ease to large-scale 
collection and sharing of personal data. Such large-scale collection and sharing are often done on the 
basis of data subject’s consent. Consent enjoys a prominent role in the European data protection 
framework. Consent has, however, been criticised for not providing individuals with adequate protection 
in online environments. This problem will only be exacerbated with the rise of IoT as IoT extends the 
data collection practices of the online environments also to offline environments.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the use of consent in the processing of personal data in the IoT. 
There are two research questions this thesis aims to answer: i) what are the problems and challenges 
related to the traditional consent based model in relation to IoT, and ii) is there an alternative way forward 
to user consent? This will be done through legal doctrinal methodology. However, this thesis will also 
take an interdisciplinary approach as it also draws from different disciplines than law such as technology, 
behavioural sciences and economics.  
This thesis shows that, in digitalized world, consent is neither freely given nor informed; thus, challenging 
the notion of valid consent. These problems arise from information and power asymmetries that are 
present between data subjects and controllers. However, IoT also brings with itself a unique set of 
problems as most IoT devices lack screens and input methods making it hard for individuals to access 
information and provide consent. Moreover, the unobtrusive and ubiquitous nature of IoT makes data 
collection activities invisible making it hard to apply transparency principle. It is also predicted that the 
presence of IoT in public spaces leads to the diminishment of private spaces. In light of this, this thesis 
discusses some alternative ways forward to user consent. The first approach focuses on improving 
consent, while the second approach aims to shift the focus away from consent by placing accountability 
on controllers. While both of these alternatives have appeal, they do not come without challenges. 
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Privacy has come under fire in the last decade due to rapid technological developments and the 
rise of the Internet. These developments have brought with them an unimaginable ease to a 
large-scale collection and sharing of personal data. While in the past privacy was seen as 
something to be protected from the unrestrained power of the state, nowadays technology 
allows both state authorities and private companies to “make use of personal data on an 
unprecedented scale in order to pursue their activities”.1 This kind of “multiveillance”, where 
individuals are tracked not just by the state but also by companies, is enabled by millions of 
smart devices connected to the Internet also known as the Internet of Things (IoT).2  
In the European Union (EU) the rights to privacy and protection of personal data are recognized 
as fundamental rights.3 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
is one of the two treaties forming the constitutional basis of the EU, also provides that everyone 
has the right to protection of personal data concerning them.4 Although the right to privacy and 
data protection are two distinct fundamental rights, it is clear that privacy is a value that the 
right to protection of personal data aims to protect.5 In the EU the fundamental right to data 
protection is being governed by the GDPR. The regulation aims to give natural persons “control 
of their own personal data”.6 According to Solove this kind of “privacy self-management” aims 
to provide people with rights that in turn provide them “with control over their personal data, 
and through this control people can decide for themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits 
of the collection, use, or disclosure of their information”.7  
At the heart of privacy self-management is the concept of consent. According to the Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party (WP29), now replaced by the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB), “the notion of consent is traditionally linked with the idea that the data subject should 
 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119, (“GDPR”), Recital 6. 
2 Jenna Lindqvist, ‘Personal Data Protection on the Internet of Things an EU Perspective’ (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Helsinki, 2018) 1 < https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/263707> accessed 1 August 2021. 
3 Article 7 and 8(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326 (“the Charter”)  
4 Article 16 (1) of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326/47. 
5 Yvonne McDermott, ‘Conceptualising the right to data protection in an era of Big Data’ (2017) 4(1) Big Data & 
Society, 2 < https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951716686994> accessed 1 August 2021. 
6 Recital 7 of the GDPR 
7 Daniel J. Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law 
Review 1879, 1880. 
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be in control of the use that is being made of his data”.8 Consent has been emphasized, for 
instance, in the Charter according to which personal data must be processed “on the basis of 
consent or some other legitimate basis laid down by law”.9 In other words, the Charter sees 
consent as a key aspect of the fundamental right of protection of natural persons in relation to 
the processing of personal data.10 That prominent position of consent is also evident in the 
GDPR.11 Significantly, consent is one of six legal bases under Article 6(1) of the GDPR that 
make processing of personal data lawful. Consent is also present in the ePrivacy Directive12, 
which complements the current EU data protection regime by setting specific privacy rights on 
electronic communications. According to the ePrivacy directive consent is a prerequisite before 
information can be stored and accessed in devices.13  
According to WP29 individual’s consent has “always been a key notion in data protection”.14 
Although consent is only one of six lawful basis of processing personal data in the GDPR, the 
others being performance of a contract15, legal obligation16, vital interest17, public task18 and 
legitimate interest19, its widespread use seems to imply that it is the most commonly used basis 
for processing personal data. This seems to be the case especially in the online world, where 
notice and consent has become the dominant model for lawfully processing personal data.20 
However, consent should be only a lawful basis of processing when “data subject is offered 
control and is offered a genuine choice with regard to accepting or declining the terms offered 
or declining them without detriment”.21 In light of this, the use of consent as a basis for 
processing personal data has faced a lot of criticism. One of the main critiques being that 
 
8 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (WP187, 13 July 2011) 8. 
9 Article 8(2) of the Charter 
10 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 5.  
11 See for example Recitals 7 and 75 of the GDPR that emphasize the need for control of personal data. 
12 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) [2002] OJ L 201/37 (“ePrivacy Directive”). 
13 Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
14 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 3. 
15 Art. 6(1)(b) of the GDPR 
16 Art. 6(1)(c) of the GDPR 
17 Art. 6(1)(d) of the GDPR 
18 Art. 6(1)(e) of the GDPR 
19 Art. 6(1)(f) of the GDPR 
20 Midas Nouwens et al., ‘Dark Partterns after the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and Demonstrating their 
Influence’ (2020) Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2. < 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.02479.pdf> accessed 8 August 2021. 
21 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (4 May 2020) 5. 
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consent does not provide an adequate protection for personal data in online environments.22 IoT 
will extend the data collection practices of the online environments to the offline 
environments.23 Therefore, it is likely that any existing problems will only exacerbate with the 
rise of IoT as more and more devices will become connected to the Internet. This increase in 
Internet connected devices means that more personal data is being collected thus complicating 
privacy self-management.  
 
1.1 Research questions and structure 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the use of consent in the processing of personal data in 
IoT. This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
i) What are the problems and challenges related to the traditional consent 
based model in relation to IoT?  
ii) Is there an alternative way forward to user consent? 
The focus of this thesis will be EU law, specifically the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive. This 
thesis will also take a brief look of the proposed regulation concerning respect for private life 
and the protection of personal data in electronic communications24 that is set to replace the 
ePrivacy Directive, as the proposed ePrivacy Regulation will cover IoT and alike technologies. 
Furthermore, as this thesis focuses on processing of personal data, it is logical to choose 
consumer IoT as the scope of the evaluation. Consumer IoT such as wearable technology, smart 
vehicles and home automation devices are directly interfaced to individuals. Moreover, 
consumer IoT devices are intended to monitor individuals’ activities, behavior and even 
health.25 This thesis will also briefly touch upon IoT in public spaces as IoT extends beyond the 
classic notion of private spaces.26  
 
22 See for example Bert-Jaap Koops, ‘The Trouble with European Data Protection Law’ (2014) 4(4) International 
Data Privacy Law 250, 251.  
23 Gilad Rosner and Erin Kenneally, ‘Clearly Opaque: Privacy Risks of the Internet of Things’ (2018) IoT Privacy 
Forum, 2 < https://www.iotprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Clearly-Opaque-Privacy-Risks-of-
the-Internet-of-Things.pdf?d8bd54&d8bd54 > accessed 15 October 2021. 
24 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and 
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications) (2021) 6087/21 
(“ePrivacy Regulation”). 
25 Gilad Rosner and Erin Kenneally, ‘Privacy and the Internet of Things. Emerging Frameworks for Policy and 
Design’ (2018) Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, 7 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3320670> accessed 30 
September 2021. 
26 Ibid, 6-8.  
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The structure of this thesis will be as follows. Following this introductory chapter, the second 
chapter aims to provide an overview of IoT. Chapter 2 will also describe EU’s data protection 
framework applicable to consumer IoT that is the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive. In addition, 
the chapter will briefly describe the proposed ePrivacy Regulation.  
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of consent as defined in the GDPR. The chapter will also look 
of the notion of consent in the ePrivacy Directive. The chapter will then move on to discuss the 
elements of valid consent. In order for consent to be valid it should be freely given, specific, 
informed and unambiguous. These elements will be analyzed in detail in subchapter 3.3. 
Moreover, the chapter will explore the requirement of explicit consent. The remaining part will 
introduce additional conditions for obtaining valid consent. 
The fourth chapter explores the problems and challenges related to consent in the processing of 
personal data in relation to IoT. Chapter 4 will start by introducing the rationale behind the use 
of consent in the European data protection framework. Then the chapter will move on to discuss 
the problems of consent and the unique set of challenges IoT brings to the consent-based model.  
As chapter four aims to show that the consent-based model is failing to provide adequate 
protection to data subjects in digital environments, chapter 5 logically asks is there an 
alternative to user consent. Two alternative ways forward are discussed: improving consent or 
shifting the focus away from consent.  
Lastly, chapter 6 will summarize what has been concluded in the previous chapters and provides 
an overall conclusion to this thesis.  
 
1.2 Methodology 
Before moving forward to the analysis, this section will describe the methodology used in this 
thesis. As the main aim of this thesis is to analyze and evaluate the use of consent in the 
processing of personal data in relation to IoT, a close look will be taken at the GDPR and the 
ePrivacy Directive. Thus, the legal doctrinal methodology will be employed.  
Legal doctrinal methodology or “black letter” methodology “aims to give a systematic 
exposition of the principles, rules and concepts governing a particular legal field or institution 
and analyses the relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving 
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unclarities and gaps in the existing law”.27 The legal doctrinal methodology thus focuses on 
primary sources of law, namely legislation and case law, and to some extent authoritative 
materials such as secondary sources of law e.g. legal literature and commentaries.28 In other 
words, the legal doctrinal methodology mandates the author to locate the relevant statutory 
provisions and other authoritative materials that are relevant to the field of enquiry.29 
This thesis places much weight on the opinions and reports of the WP29 and EDPB. The EDPB 
has been established by Article 68 of the GDPR. It is an independent advisory board on data 
protection consisting of the representatives of national supervisory authorities and the European 
Data Protection Supervisor. Although EDPB’s (and its predecessors WP29’s) opinions are not 
legally binding, they are considered authoritative in the field of data protection law.30 Due to 
this particular nature of the EDPB (and its predecessor), and the fact that as of yet there is not 
much case law available on data protection31, this thesis considers their opinions and reports to 
hold persuasive authority. Moreover, this thesis makes use of legal literature and academic 
debate surrounding the use of consent and IoT. 
In order to answer the research questions, the doctrinal research undertaken in this thesis also 
takes a reformist approach. While pure doctrinal research analyses existing rules and the 
relationship between these rules, a reformist approach evaluates the adequacy of these existing 
rules and recommends changes to any rules found wanting.32 Although reform-oriented 
research has been described by many as a separate methodology, “most ‘good’ quality doctrinal 
research goes well beyond description, analysis, and critique, and invariably suggests ways the 
law could be amended or the philosophy, processes or administration of the law could be 
improved”.33 Thus, this thesis considers the reformist approach undertaken as a support tool of 
the doctrinal legal research.  
 
27 Jan M. Smits, ‘What is legal doctrine? On the aims and methods of legal-dogmatic research’ (2015) 
Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2015/06, 5 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644088 > accessed 8 August 2021.  
28 Ibid, 14-15.  
29 See Ibid (n 27) 12-16; Marnix Vincent Roderick Snel, ‘Source-usage within doctrinal legal inquiry: choices, 
problems, and challenges’ (2014) Law and Method < 
http://www.lawandmethod.nl/tijdschrift/lawandmethod/2014/06/RENM-D-13-00003/fullscreen> accessed 8 
August 2021. 
30 Manon Oostveen, Protecting Individuals Against the Negative Impact of Big Data. Potential and Limitations 
of the Privacy and Data Protection Law (Kluwer Law International, 2018) ch. 4. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Terry Hutchinson, ‘The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law’ 




IoT is very technical in nature. Moreover, law does not operate in a vacuum. Therefore, this 
thesis will also draw from different disciplines than law such as technology, behavioral sciences 
and economics. By doing this the analysis takes steps away from doctrinal legal methodology 
towards interdisciplinary one. This kind of interdisciplinary approach allows this thesis to get 
a wider and more informed understanding of the social context and technology to which the 
field of enquiry relates.34 Interdisciplinary research, however, requires a balancing act as it is 
important that the focus of this thesis will not be shifted too much away from law. That is to 
say, it is important that this thesis provides a general description of IoT, without, however, 



















34 See Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal research’ in Andrew Knight and Les Ruddock (eds.), Advanced research Methods 





2.1 Defining IoT 
IoT is a complex subject as it is based on several different technologies and disciplines. 
Consequently, IoT has been defined in a number of different ways. According to WP29 IoT 
refers to: 
“an infrastructure in which billions of sensors embedded in common, everyday devices 
– “things” as such, or things linked to other objects or individuals – are designed to 
record, process, store and transfer data and, as they are associated with unique 
identifiers, interact with other devices or systems using networking capabilities”.35 
The European Parliament, in turn, has defined IoT as: 
“a distributed network connecting physical objects that are capable of sensing or acting 
on their environment and able to communicate with each other, other machines and 
computers”.36  
And lastly, the European Commission describes IoT as follows: 
“The IoT is the next step towards digitalization where all objects and people can be 
interconnected through communication networks, in and across private, public and 
industrial spaces, and report about their status and/or about the status of the 
surrounding environment”.37 
What is common with these descriptions is the existence of objects that communicate with each 
other and are connected to the Internet. Such smart devices or sensors come in all shapes and 
sizes. Over the last years we have seen a rise of smart mobile devices, smart fridges, cars and 
TVs, as well as smart meters measuring the domestic consumption of water and energy and 
wearable devices such as smart watches. In other words, the Internet has moved away from just 
our computer screens to everyday objects in the domestic and consumer world.38 However, IoT 
 
35 WP29, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the Internet of Things’ (WP 223, 16 September 
2014) 4.  
36 European Parliament, ’The Internet of Things: Opportunities and challenges’, (Briefing) (May 2015), 1 
<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/557012/EPRS_BRI(2015)557012_EN.pdf> 
accessed 9 August 2021. 
37 European Commission, ‘Advancing the Internet of Things in Europe’ SWD(2016) 110 final, 5. 
38 Lilian Edwards, ‘Data Protection and e-Privacy: From Spam and Cookies to Big Data, Machine Learning and 
Profiling’ in Lilian Edwards (ed.) Law, Policy and the Internet (Hart Publishing, 2019) 148.  
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should not be seen as an extension of Internet, but rather “a number of independent systems 
that operate with their own infrastructures (and partly rely on existing Internet 
infrastructures)”.39 The spread of IoT into domestic and human environments has also given a 
rise to specific terms such as “smart homes” referring to IoT being applied to the management 
of houses and “smart cities” where IoT is used to optimize and improve the efficiency of city 
infrastructure and resources.40  
 
2.2 IoT and data 
The network of Internet connected “things” has long surpassed the number or people.41 It has 
been estimated that by 2025 there would be 30.9 billion IoT connected devices.42 In the 
consumer sector it is expected that the smart home revenue in Europe will grow from 17 billion 
to 38.1 billion euros between 2020 and 2025, while the worldwide consumer IoT products and 
services revenue is expected to grow from 105.7 billion in 2019 to 404.6 billion euros in 2030.43  
As the number of these smart “things” grow, so will the volume of data generated by them as 
these devices are “characterized by a high degree of autonomous data capture, event transfer, 
network connectivity and interoperability”.44 This exponential growth in the availability of data 
as well as its automated use is often referred as Big Data.45 These large amounts of data are 
then collected, further combined and processed enabling, for example, businesses and 
governments to gain an insight on “how individuals live, work, travel, study, eat, or sleep, and 
how and what they consume”.46 Moreover, it has been shown that IoT devices such as smart 
phone sensors can show “user’s mood; stress levels; personality type; bipolar disorder; 
 
39 European Commission, ‘Internet of Things – An action plan for Europe’ COM(2009) 278 final, 2. 
40 European Parliament (n 36). 
41 Lilian Edwards, ‘Data Protection and e-Privacy: From Spam and Cookies to Big Data, Machine Learning and 
Profiling’ (n 38) 148.  
42 Statista, Internet of Things (IoT) and non-IoT active device connections worldwide from 2010 to 2025 < 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1101442/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide/> accessed 9 
August 2021. 
43 European Commission, ‘Preliminary report – Sector Inquiry into Consumer Internet of Things’ SWD(2021) 144 
final, 6.  
44 CASAGRAS, ’RFID and the Inclusive Model for the Internet of Things’ (2009) CASAGRAS EU Framework 
Project, Final Report, 10 
<www.rfidglobal.eu%20CASAGRAS%20IoT%20Final%20Report%20low%20resolution.pdf> accessed 2 April 
2020. 
45 Gloria Gonzalez Fuster and Amandine Scherrer, ‘Big Data and Smart Devices and Their Impact on Privacy’ 
(2015) Study for the LIBE Committee (European Parliament), 7 <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/65d436ef-7273-11e5-9317-01aa75ed71a1> accessed 9 August 2021. 
46 Ibid, 8.  
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demographic (e.g. gender, marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; overall well-being, 
progression of Parkinson’s disease, sleep patterns, happiness, levels of exercise; and types of 
physical exercise and movement”.47 Such information is expected to bring many benefits to 
businesses, consumer and governments alike.48 These benefits may materialize for example 
through better healthcare, improved products, increased efficiency, cost savings, reduced 
consumption of resources and energy and through other solutions addressing societal 
challenges.49 However, the collection, transmission, analyses, storage and sharing of data also 
raises a significant number of privacy and personal data concerns.50 
 
2.3 Regulating processing of data in the IoT 
 
2.3.1 The GDPR 
The GDPR regulates the processing of personal data. Unless operating in an industrial 
environment, the data collected by IoT devices will most likely qualify as personal data in the 
sense of the GDPR.51 According to Article 4(1) of the GDPR personal data means: 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data 
subject”); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the 
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that 
natural person”. 
Furthermore, information about a device can qualify as personal data if it relates to an 
individual. The GDPR makes it clear that natural persons may be identified with online 
identifiers, such as IP addresses and RFIG tags, which are provided by smart devices and 
 
47 Scott R. Peppet, ‘Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards Managing Discrimination, Privacy, 
Security & Consent’ (2014) 93 Texas Law Review 85, 116. 
48 See European Parliament (n 36) 3-4. 
49 European Commission, ‘Digitising European Industry Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single Market 
SWD(2016) 110 final, 8. 
50 See Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, ‘Privacy & Security in a Connected World (January 2015), ii 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-
2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf> accessed 28 August 2021. 
51 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the Internet of 
Things’ (n 35) 4. 
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applications.52 These online identifiers enable identification when leaving traces; especially 
when combined with other information received by servers or other devices.53 
In other words, “personal data” may include data, which has no or very little direct connection 
to a particular person.54 However, when that data is combined with other data, that data can 
become “personal”. This idea of personal data being formed from multiple pieces of data is 
especially relevant in terms of IoT. Data collected by IoT devices can easily fall within 
“personal data” as it is the business idea of IoT stakeholders to collect, analyze and combine 
large volumes of data to get the insight or result they want.55 The more data there is available 
the better or more accurate the end result will be.56 In addition, the large scale collection 
maximizes the utility of the data for the IoT stakeholders as “part of the benefit can only be 
realized by combining one set of data with others or through analyzing very large quantities of 
data to establish patterns or trends”.57 
The GDPR also makes a distinction between “personal data” and “sensitive personal data”. 
Sensitive personal data is a set of special categories of personal data, which are considered 
sensitive in relation to fundamental rights and freedoms, and thus merit a special protection.58 
Such data includes information about racial and ethnic origin, political opinions, religious and 
philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data and biometric data where processed 
to uniquely identify someone as well as data concerning individuals’ health, sex life and sexual 
orientation.59 According to the GDPR the principle rule is that the processing of such data is 
prohibited, however there are exceptions to this general prohibition.60 Many IoT devices and 
applications collect such sensitive data. A good example of such sensitive personal data is 
health data collected by wearable fitness trackers and watches. Moreover, personal data can 
become sensitive as time goes on.61 For instance, location data can become sensitive, when 
 
52 Recital 30 of the GDPR 
53 Ibid. 
54 Lindqvist (n 2) 38. 
55 European Parliament (n 36) 6; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent 
Developments on the Internet of Things’ (n 35) 4. 
56 Daniel Bastos et al., ‘GDPR Privacy Implications for the Internet of Things’ (4th Annual IoT Security Foundation 
Conference, London, 2018), 2 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331991225_GDPR_Privacy_Implications_for_the_Internet_of_Thi
ngs > accessed 16 August 2021. 
57 European Parliament (n 36) 9. 
58 Recital 51 of the GDPR 
59 Article 9(1) of the GDPR 
60 Article 9(2) of the GDPR gives exceptions to this rule one of which is that data subject has given explicit 
consent to the processing. 
61 Lindqvist (n 2) 60. 
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individual’s location is tracked over time. Frequent visits to a particular church or hospital can 
reveal information about individual’s religion and health. In other words, although an IoT 
stakeholder would not directly collect sensitive personal data, they might be able to infer it from 
the data collected. The fact that location data can disclose sensitive information has also been 
acknowledged by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which found in its ruling 
in Tele2 case that traffic and location data allow "very precise conclusions" to be drawn about 
the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, including their everyday habits, 
their places of residence, daily movements, the activities carried out, their social relationships 
and social environments, which in part, can provide the means to establish a profile of the 
person concerned.62 
 
2.3.2 ePrivacy Directive and the draft ePrivacy Regulation 
The ePrivacy Directive is focused on protecting privacy and confidentiality of personal data in 
electronic communication sector.63 The ePrivacy Directive is a lex specialis to the GDPR, 
meaning that if both regimes apply, the special rules of ePrivacy Directive will prevail over 
general provisions of the GDPR.64 While the GDPR is grounded on Article 8 of the Charter 
(protection of personal data), the ePrivacy Directive also details a right to respect for private 
and family life, as enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter.65 The ePrivacy Directive will likely 
apply to IoT devices as the Directive is applicable to data collection from terminal equipment, 
in other words from a device connected to a public communication network. 
According to Article 5(3) of the Directive where information is stored or to accessed on a user’s 
or subscriber’s device, the user must give consent to such storage or access. As the article refers 
to any type of information, the information also includes personal data. This is confirmed by 
Recital 24 of the Directive which states that user’s device and any information stored in it are 
part of the user’s private sphere requiring protection. The ePrivacy Directive also details rules 
for the processing of location and traffic data for the providers of public communication 
 
62 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C- 698/15 Tele 2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen, and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v Watson [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para 99. 
63 Article 1 of the ePrivacy Directive. 
64 See Article 95 and Recital 173 of the GDPR that confirm the lex generalis and lex specialis relationship 
between the GDPR and the ePrivacy Directive, with Article 95 stating that it shall not impose additional 
obligations on natural or legal persons in relation to processing in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services in public communication networks in the Union in relation to 
matters for which they are subject to specific obligations with the same objective set out in Directive 
2002/58/EC that is the ePrivacy Directive. 
65 Recital 2 of the ePrivacy Directive 
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networks and service providers.66 This kind of metadata is a key piece of data collected by IoT 
devices.67 The Directive provides different rules for these two types of data, however, through 
modern communication technologies and services the line between these has become blurred.68  
While the rules for processing location and traffic data only apply to providers of publicly 
available electronic communication services and providers of public communication networks, 
the rules detailed in Article 5(3) set out standards for all actors that wish to store, or access 
information stored in user’s device. In other words, article 5(3) is a general provision that 
applies to every entity regardless of the sector they operate in or the nature of the data being 
stored or accessed. It should, however, be noted that data such as traffic and location data are 
not collected only by traditional service providers such as telecoms and internet service 
providers, but also by many different organizations via different routes. These organizations 
can thus gain access to a very detailed overview of user’s movements and communication 
patterns, while the ePrivacy Directive’s scope does not apply to them as long as they do not 
access the information stored in user’s device.69 Most of ePrivacy Directive’s provisions apply 
only to these traditional providers, thus making its scope narrower than the GDPR as the latter 
applies regardless of the sector. 
The ePrivacy Directive does not explicitly mention IoT devices, and as seen above it is clear 
that the Directive has been designed to fit more traditional electronic communication providers 
as well as traditional devices such as computers and mobile phones. Thus, it is unclear to what 
extent does Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive apply to IoT. For example, can an IoT sensor 
be seen as a terminal equipment of a user? Moreover, who can be considered to be the user or 
subscriber of the device? As Lilian Edwards puts it “is the owner of the connected car (who 
may not be the usual occupier) – or everyone who rides in it? Since the data of all riders is 
likely to be collected, one would hope the latter”.70 These questions are left unanswered by the 
Directive. However, the ePrivacy Directive was amended in 2009 by the Citizen’s Rights 
 
66 Article 6 and 9 of the ePrivacy Directive 
67 Lilian Edwards, ‘Data Protection and e-Privacy: From Spam and Cookies to Big Data, Machine Learning and 
Profiling (n 38) 149. 
68 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the evaluation and review of the ePrivacy Directive’ (WP 240, 
19 July 2016), 13. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Lilian Edwards, ‘Data Protection and e-Privacy: From Spam and Cookies to Big Data, Machine Learning and 
Profiling’ (n 38) 152.  
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Directive to clarify the role of IoT devices.71 Recital 56 of the Citizen’s Rights Directive reads 
as follows:  
“technological progress allows the development of new applications based on devices 
for data collection and identification…When such devices are connected to publicly 
available electronic communications networks or make use of electronic 
communications services as a basic infrastructure, the relevant provisions of Directive 
2002/58/EC (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)…should apply”.   
It is, however, the intention of EU to repeal the ePrivacy Directive, as a new ePrivacy 
Regulation is under discussions. The proposal of the ePrivacy Regulation specifically mentions 
IoT stating: 
“The use of machine-to-machine and Internet of Things services, that is to say services 
involving an automated transfer of data and information between devices or software-
based applications with limited or no human interaction, is emerging. In order to 
ensure full protection of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of communications, 
and to promote a trusted and secure Internet of Things in the digital single market, this 
Regulation, in particular the requirements relating to the confidentiality of 
communications, should apply to the transmission of such services. The transmission 
of machine-to-machine or Internet of Things services regularly involves the 
conveyance of signals via an electronic communications network and, hence, 
constitutes an electronic communications service. This Regulation should apply to the 
provider of the transmission service if that transmission is carried out via a publicly 
available electronic communications service or network”.72 
In other words, it is clear that the proposed ePrivacy Regulation is intended to govern IoT. 
Further, it appears from the proposal that the ePrivacy Regulation may have, in some ways, a 
broader material scope than the GDPR. For example, the proposal provides that machine-to-
machine communications will be covered by the Regulation. In practice, this would mean that 
non-personal data communicated between machines will be covered by the ePrivacy Regulation 
as the GDPR only applies to processing of personal data. Interestingly, however, the proposal 
 
71 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws [2009] OJ L 337. 
72 Recital 12 of the ePrivacy Regulation. 
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Regulation has limited the material scope of the Regulation to transmission services and 
excluded the application layer, in other words, mobile applications.73 Therefore, mobile 
applications would fall within the GDPR insofar as they process personal data. Although this 
thesis is mainly interested in IoT devices, this is of interest as mobile applications work as the 
primary interface through which individuals interact with their IoT devices.74 For example, 
most smart home devices such as security, lighting, heating etc. will be controllable through a 
mobile application. 
Moreover, the proposal Regulation extends the protection of “information stored in the terminal 
equipment”75 to information “emitted by terminal equipment” as well as to any interference 
with the terminal equipment including using its processing capabilities.76 However, as in the 
ePrivacy Directive, such interferences shall be allowed in case the end-user has given his or her 
consent. In addition, the proposal Regulation covers metadata related to terminal equipment of 
an end-user.77 Such metadata could include for example “the numbers called, the websites 
visited, geographical location, the time, date and duration when an individual made a call 
etc.,”.78 This clearly applies to a lot of data collected by IoT devices. What’s more, the 
Regulation recognizes that metadata may reveal very sensitive data such as habits and social 
relationships etc.79 To conclude, the ePrivacy Regulation may apply to all metadata related to 








73 Recital 12 of the ePrivacy Regulation. 
74 Ihor Feokristov, ‘Mobile IoT Apps and All You need to Know About Them’ (Relevant) < 
https://relevant.software/blog/mobile-iot-apps/ > accessed 1 September 2021; WP29, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the 
Recent Developments on the Internet of Things’ (n 35) 12. 
75 Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
76 Article 8(2) of the ePrivacy Regulation 
77 See Recital 2 and 20 of the ePrivacy Regulation 
78 Recital 2 of the ePrivacy Regulation 
79 Recital 2 of the ePrivacy Regulation 
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3. Consent  
 
3.1 Consent and other legal grounds for processing personal data 
Under the EU data protection framework, processing of personal data has to be lawful, fair and 
transparent.80 The GDPR sets out several grounds for the lawful processing of personal data. 
According to Recital 40 of the GDPR “in order for processing to be lawful, personal data should 
be processed on the basis of the consent of the data subject concerned or some other legitimate 
basis”. Section 1 of Article 6 lays down the grounds for lawful processing. These grounds are 
as follows: 
a) a consent has been given by the data subject for a specific purpose  
b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract 
c) there is a legal obligation 
d) protecting the vital interest of the data subject or another person 
e) public interest or exercising official authority 
f) to carry out a legitimate interest of a data controller or a third party, where these interests 
do not override the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject 
According to Article 6, at least one of these grounds must apply for the processing of personal 
data to be lawful.  
The relationship between the lawful grounds leaves some questions open. Although the GDPR 
does not suggest a hierarchy between the lawful grounds for processing personal data, it is 
evident that consent is put in a prominent position.81 Not only is consent listed first, but it is 
also referred to in the Recitals; consent is clearly presented as a lawful ground while a reference 
is only made to “the other” grounds.82 In addition, consent is used in the GDPR both as a general 
ground for lawfulness and as specific ground for processing sensitive personal data. The 
prominence of consent is also advocated by its widespread use as well as its history in the EU 
data protection framework. The important role of consent has been emphasized in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter. Therefore, consent has also been seen in some Member States as a 
 
80 See Recital 39 of the GDPR 
81 See also Shaira Thobani, ‘Processing Personal Data and the Role of Consent’ (2020) 2020 European Journal of 
Privacy Law & Technology 93; Benjamin Bergemann, ‘The Consent Paradox: Accounting for the 
Prominent Role of Consent in Data Protection’ in Marit Hansen et al. (eds.), Privacy and Identity Management. 
The Smart Revolution (Springer International Publishing, 2018); Koops (n 22). 
82 See Recitals 40 and 51 of the GDPR 
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preferred ground for processing personal data as the role of consent has been explicitly 
recognized in the Charter.83 Further, consent has been considered a lawful ground for 
processing personal data since the Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.84 The Data Protection 
Directive presented the modern definition of consent, 85 which has not changed much since the 
introduction of the GDPR.  
Article 4(11) of the GDPR defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a 
clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him 
or her”. In other words, a valid consent consists of all of these elements.  
  
3.2 Consent in the ePrivacy Directive 
As we saw in section 2.3.2, consent is also very much present in the ePrivacy Directive as some 
of the provisions of the Directive require consent. This is the case, for example, regarding 
storing of information or accessing information already stored in user’s or subscriber’s terminal 
equipment detailed in Article 5(3). In relation to IoT, this consent requirement is the primary 
concern of device manufacturers as well as other stakeholders who want to access data stored 
in the IoT device.86 In such circumstances, the stakeholders must ensure that the user or 
subscriber has been provided with clear and comprehensive information about the purposes of 
the processing.87  
There are also exceptions to the Article 5(3) consent requirement. These exceptions include i) 
“technical storage or access for the sole purpose of carrying out or facilitating the transmission 
of a communication over an electronic communication network”, or ii) “as strictly necessary in 
order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user”.88 
However, it has been noted that the data transmitted by IoT devices “by default” for technical 
reasons, is increasingly used for intrusive purposes such as marketing and market analyses that 
 
83 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 7. 
84 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 
281/31 (“Data Protection Directive”). 
85 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 5. 
86 WP29, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on the Recent Developments on the Internet of Things’ (n 35) 14. 
87 Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
88 Ibid.  
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is not related to the original purpose of broadcasting.89 It is not clear from the Directive whether 
such marketing purposes could be considered strictly necessary to deliver a service requested 
by a user.  
Consent is also required where location data other than traffic data is processed by the public 
communications networks or publicly available electronic communications services: “where 
location data other than traffic data, relating to users or subscribers of public communications 
networks or publicly available electronic communications services, can be processed, such data 
may only be processed when they are made anonymous, or with the consent of the users or 
subscribers”.90 As the ePrivacy Directive differentiates between location data and traffic data, 
consent is required in regard to traffic data when a provider of a publicly available electronic 
communication service processes traffic data for marketing purposes, or to provide a value 
added service.91 Value added service is defined as “any service which requires the processing 
of traffic data or location data other than traffic data beyond what is necessary for the 
transmission of a communication or the billing thereof”.92  
Keeping in mind the lex specialis – lex generalis relationship between the ePrivacy Directive 
and the GDPR, it should be noted that the processing of personal data with the complete range 
of possible lawful grounds provided by Article 6 of the GDPR cannot be applied when the 
ePrivacy Regulation explicitly states that a consent of the user or subscriber is required and the 
information constitutes personal data.93 For example, Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
shall take precedence over Article 6 of the GDPR with regards to the storing or accessing 
information in a device insofar as the information constitutes personal data.94 However, any 
processing of personal data after the abovementioned processing operations, including 
processing personal data obtained by accessing information in the user’s device, must be based 
on one of the grounds in Article 6 of the GDPR in order to be lawful. To put it another way, 
once the data accessed on a user’s device has been uploaded on a server and there is a desire to 
further process such information, the processing is not subject to the ePrivacy Directive 
anymore but to the provisions of the GDPR. 
 
89 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the evaluation and review of the ePrivacy Directive’ (n 68) 11. 
90 Article 9(1) of the ePrivacy Directive 
91 Article 6(3) of the ePrivacy Directive 
92 Article 2(g) of the ePrivacy Directive 
93 EDPB, ‘Opinion 5/2019 on the interplay between the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR, in particular regarding 
the competence, tasks and powers of data protection authorities’ (12 March 2019), 13-14. 
94 Ibid.  
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The concept of consent in the ePrivacy Directive is defined in Article 2(f) according to which 
consent “corresponds to the data subject’s consent in Directive 95/46/EC”. As the Data 
Protection Directive has been replaced by the GDPR, consent shall have the same meaning as 
defined in the GDPR. This has been confirmed by the EDPB according to which the references 
to the repealed Data Protection Directive shall be understood as references to the GDPR.95 In 
other words, this means that when the ePrivacy Directive requires user’s or subscriber’s 
consent, the criteria to determine whether consent is valid is the same as in the GDPR.  
 
3.3 Elements of valid consent 
As described above, the requirements for valid consent under the EU data protection framework 
are freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of data subject’s wishes. These 
requirements apply whenever consent is sought. The meaning of these elements of consent, will 
be discussed in detail below.  
 
3.3.1 Freely given 
For a consent to be considered freely given the first element is that the data subject is able to 
exercise real choice.96 That means that there is no risk of “deception, intimidation, coercion or 
significant negative consequences” if the data subject does not consent.97 If any of these 
elements are present, the data subject’s consent cannot be considered freely given. This is also 
clarified by Recital 42 of the GDPR according to which “consent should not be regarded as 
freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw 
consent without detriment”. 
Consent is not considered to be freely given where there is a clear imbalance of power between 
the data subject and controller. According to Recital 43: “in order to ensure that consent is freely 
given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a 
specific case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in 
particular where the controller is a public authority, and it is therefore unlikely that consent was 
freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation”. In other words, Recital 43 makes 
 
95 See EDPB, ‘Statement of the EDPB on the revision of the ePrivacy Regulation and its impact on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the privacy and confidentiality of their communications’ (25 May 2018) < 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_on_eprivacy_en.pdf> accessed 18 
September 2021. 
96 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 12. 
97 Ibid.  
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it clear that it is unlikely that public authorities can rely on consent for processing personal data. 
Imbalance of power also occurs in employment relationships.98 Due to the nature of employee-
employer relationship, it is not likely that the employee is able to deny his or her employer 
consent to data processing as the consequence might be a loss of a job.  
Freely given consent also implies that the data subject has control of the processing of his or 
her personal data.99 If consent is bundled with the acceptance of terms and conditions, or there 
is an inability to refuse of withdraw consent without detriment, it is presumed that consent is 
not freely given.100 Article 7(4) of the GDPR highlights that the performance of a contract, 
including a delivery of service, should not be conditional on consent, where such processing of 
personal data is not necessary for the performance of that contract. According to Recital 43 of 
the GDPR in such a case consent shall not be considered freely given. The purpose behind 
article 7(4) is that consent does not become the counter-performance of a contract.101 As consent 
is a distinct legal ground from the performance of a contract, these two legal grounds “cannot 
be merged and blurred”.102  
Furthermore, Recital 43 also clarifies that consent is presumed not to be freely given if it does 
not allow separate consent to be given to different personal data processing operations 
respectively. In other words, consent mechanisms should be executed in way that offers 
granularity. Consent should cover “all processing activities carried out for the same purpose or 
purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of 
them”.103 If the process does not allow the data subject to give separate consent for each separate 
purpose, there is considered to be a lack of freedom.  
 
3.3.2 Specific 
The second element of valid consent requires that consent must be given in relation to “one or 
more specific purposes”.104 In other words, the data subject should know the exact purpose of 
the processing of his or her data. A blanket consent is thus not acceptable. Further, if data is 
processed for multiple purposes, the data subject should consent to all of them.105 In other 
 
98 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 21) 9. 
99 Ibid, 7. 
100 See for further discussion section 3.5.2. 
101 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 21) 10. 
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words, there must be granularity in consent requests as discussed in section 3.3 above. For 
example, if a consent is asked for the data subject to receive behavioral advertising that same 
consent would not cover transfer of personal data to third parties. Instead, a separate consent 
should be received for that particular purpose. Moreover, the GDPR does not contain a specific 
time limit for consent. When data is processed for a particular purpose and later on that purpose 
changes or evolves considerably, the original consent is no longer valid.106 In such an instance 
the data subject must be informed of these changes and a new consent must be sought to such 
new specific purpose.107  
In addition, pursuant to Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR personal data shall be collected for 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. In other words, prior to obtaining consent, the data 
controlled must consider what specific purpose or purposes the data will be used for.108 This 
purpose limitation functions as a safeguard so that the purpose of the data processing is not 
gradually widened and blurred.109 The danger with this “function creep” is that personal data is 
used beyond the original purpose resulting to unanticipated use of the personal data and the loss 
of data subjects control.110 The purpose limitation thus limits for which purposes the data 
collected can be used for, and also helps to establish safeguards on data protection.111 
The requirement that consent must be specific is also closely linked to the requirement of 
informed consent. In order for the data subject to be able to give specific consent, he or she 
needs to be made aware of the different aspects of the processing: the purposes of the processing 
and what data is being processed. Being clear and specific about the purposes of the processing 
is necessary also to comply with the principle of transparency.112 According to WP29 “a 
purpose that is vague or general, such for instance ‘improving users’ experience’, ‘marketing 
purposes’, ‘IT-security purposes’ or ‘future research’ will – without more detail – usually not 
meet the criteria of being ‘specific’”.113 
 
106 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 21) 23. 
107 WP29, ‘Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent’ (n 8) 19. 
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109 EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (n 21) 14. 
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3.3.3 Informed  
The third element of valid consent is that the consent is informed. As seen above, the concepts 
of specific and informed consent are linked. In order for the data subject to be able to provide 
informed consent, they must have received specific information prior to consenting. In other 
words, the data subject must be able to understand to what he or she is consenting to. This also 
applies to being able to withdraw his or her consent.114 Informed consent is thus integrally 
linked to the principal of transparency. If the data subject is not provided with appropriate 
information, the consent will not be valid.115  
According to WP29 guidelines on transparency data subjects should be able to determine prior 
to processing what the scope and consequences of the processing entail.116 In addition, it should 
not come as a surprise to them later on how their personal data has been used.117 This has also 
been highlighted in Recital 39 of the GDPR according to which “natural persons should be 
made aware of risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to the processing of personal data 
and how to exercise their rights in relation to such processing”. As per WP29, these are also 
important aspects with the principle of fairness, a principle that is closely related with the 
principle of transparency.118  
According to Recital 42 of the GDPR “for consent to be informed, the data subject should be 
aware at least of the identity of the controller and the purposes of the processing for which the 
personal data are intended”. Further, according to the GDPR when requesting consent, such 
request should be presented in a clear and plain language and in a manner, which is clearly 
distinguishable from the other manners and provided in an intelligible and easily accessible 
form.119 In other words, the way the information is presented is crucial to whether consent can 
be considered to be valid. According to the EDPB that means, for example, that the information 
provided by the controllers should be understandable to an average person and not only to a 
lawyer.120 Moreover, the accessibility and visibility of information is important. For instance, 
the data subject should not have to seek out the appropriate information. For example, the 
information should be clearly different from non-privacy related information such as general 
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terms and conditions.121 Recital 32 of the GDPR also provides that consent requests cannot be 
unnecessarily disruptive to users. 
 
3.3.4 Unambiguous indication of wishes 
The last element of valid consent is unambiguous indication of wishes. In other words, there 
should be no doubt whether the data subject has given his or her consent to the processing.122 
According to Article 4(11) of the GDPR consent requires “a statement or clear affirmative 
action”. According to the EDPB this means that consent must always be given through an active 
and deliberate motion or declaration.123 This could be done, for example, by written statement 
or oral statement, ticking a box when visiting an website, choosing technical settings for 
information society services or another statement or conduct.124 However, the EDPB has 
emphasized that consent cannot be obtained through blanket acceptance of general terms and 
conditions which include consent provisions.125 Such acceptance cannot be seen as clear 
affirmative action to consent to the processing of personal data.   
The GDPR is also clear that silence or inactivity does not constitute consent.126 In addition, 
according to the GDPR the same goes with pre-ticked boxes.127 This has been confirmed by the 
CJEU in Planet49 case.128 In this case the CJEU held that the requirement of “indication” 
clearly means that there must be active rather than passive behavior from the data subject.129 
Thus, a pre-ticked box does not constitute active behavior and cannot be regarded as valid 
consent.130 The CJEU reasoned that it is impossible in these kind of situations to know whether 
the user has given his or her consent to the processing by not removing the tick from the pre-
selected box and whether such consent is informed.131 It could be that the user has not read the 
information regarding the pre-ticked box or has not even seen the checkbox.132 In other words, 
consent must be opt-in consent; opt-out consent is not valid under the GDPR.   
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The EDPB has also emphasized that consent mechanisms should be designed and presented in 
a way that it is clear to the data subject which action they are consenting to.133 The action must 
be based on clear information and that information should be presented in a way that it is not 
mistaken for other material such as for an advertisement.134 Further, the indication of wishes 
must be an action that can be told apart from other actions.135 For instance, scrolling or swiping 
through a webpage does not constitute an unambiguous indication of wishes according to the 
EDPB as such action cannot be distinguished from other action by user.136  
Recital 66 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive reads that consent can be expressed through “using 
the appropriate settings of a browser or other application” where it is technically possible and 
effective. As the rule seems to apply to more traditional devices such as computers and smart 
phones, it is unclear whether under this rule users could choose when starting to use their new 
IoT device their privacy settings and such settings would constitute consent. Moreover, 
according to WP29 such settings “only deliver consent in very limited circumstances”.137 For 
example, by simply using a browser or other application which by default enables collection 
and processing of personal data, does not constitute an unambiguous indication of the data 
subject’s wishes and thus a valid consent.138 Furthermore, an average person is not aware how 
to access and use their device settings; not even when the instructions are included in the privacy 
policy.139 Therefore, it could be hard for a controller to be confident that the data subject has 
been fully informed and actively made changes to their device settings.140 
 
3.4 Explicit consent 
There is a stricter regime for special categories of personal data. The processing of such 
sensitive personal data is prohibited, unless an exception has been provided for in the GDPR, 
or specifically in Union law or national legislation.141 According to Recital 51 of the GDPR 
“derogations from the general prohibition for processing such special categories of personal 
data should be explicitly provided, inter alia, where the data subject gives his or her explicit 
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consent or in respect of specific needs in particular where the processing is carried out in the 
course of legitimate activities by certain associations or foundations the purpose of which is to 
permit the exercise of fundamental freedoms”. 
Sensitive personal data may thus be processed by virtue of GDPR if the data subject has given 
his or her explicit consent,142 the processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject,143 the processing is done in the course of legitimate activities of a foundation, 
association or any other not-for-profit body,144 the processing relates to data manifestly made 
public by the data subject,145 or processing is necessary to defend a legal claim146. Moreover, 
processing sensitive data is allowed if the processing is necessary for legal reasons (such as 
obligations under employment, social security and social protection law),147 processing is 
necessary for the reasons of substantial public interest148 or public interest in the area of public 
health149, processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for 
the assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of 
health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems,150 or 
processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes.151  
Although explicit consent remains one of many exceptions for processing sensitive personal 
data, it seems most likely that explicit consent will be the main exception used for processing 
sensitive data in commercial context. Although there is a linguistic indicator between “regular 
consent” and “explicit consent”, the difference between these two standards is unlikely to be 
very large since there is already a “statement of clear affirmative action” -standard in place. 
According to the EDPB the term explicit refers to the way consent must be expressed.152 Hence, 
the term explicit has been seen as a synonym to express consent.153 An obvious way to make 
such an express statement of consent would be through a hand-written statement or a signature. 
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However, in an online environment such explicit consent could be given by filling in an 
electronic form, sending an email, uploading a scanned document carrying the signature of the 
data subject or using an electronic signature.154 
The WP29 has describes explicit consent as encompassing “all situations where individuals are 
presented with a proposal to agree or disagree to a particular use or disclosure of their personal 
information and they respond actively to the question”.155 It is thus clear that explicit consent 
requires an active motion from the data subject. This in turn means that a consent that is inferred 
from someone’s actions cannot be considered explicit consent.156 However, such active motion 
or declaration is also required in case of a “regular consent”.  
The EDPB also suggest a two-stage verification process as a way to make sure that explicit 
consent is valid.157 According to the EDPB such process could go as follows: information is 
sent to the data subject explaining the intent to process sensitive personal data and the purposes 
for such processing. In order to consent, the data subject would be required to reply, “I agree”. 
After that a verification link or code would be send to the data subject through an email or SMS 
to confirm the agreement. This suggestion of the EDPB thus seems to imply that explicit 
consent would require a statement of words rather than just an active motion.  
It appears that there is only a subtle difference between “regular consent” and “explicit 
consent”. In other words, it seems that these two concepts are somewhat blurred. Other than the 
two-stage verification process, the methods for obtaining each of them seem very similar. In 
addition, each of them requires a clear indication of the data subject’s wishes.  
 
3.5 Other conditions for obtaining valid consent 
 
3.5.1 Prior consent 
Consent must be obtained prior to processing of data. The timing of consent has not been 
explicitly mentioned in the GDPR. However, such timing can be inferred from the language of 
the Regulation. According to Article 6(1)(1) of the GDPR processing of personal data shall be 
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lawful if subject “has given” his or her consent to the processing. The language used here 
implies that consent must be obtained before processing commences. 
Further, the ePrivacy Directive explicitly includes requirements of prior consent. For example, 
according to Article 6 of the Directive in order for the publicly available electronic 
communication service provider to process traffic data for the purpose of marketing electronic 
communication services or value-added services, such provider must provide the user or 
subscriber with information and to obtain the user’s or subscriber’s prior consent.158  
As WP29 points out, obtaining consent before the processing of data is crucial in order to make 
the processing legitimate.159 Without such prior consent, the processing would lack a legal 
ground.160 If such consent is refused and the processing has started, the processing is 
unlawful.161 
 
3.5.2 Withdrawal of consent 
According to Article 7(3) of the GDPR data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her 
consent at any time. By being able to withdraw his or her consent, the data subject is able to 
exercise some form of control of his or her data.162 Although withdrawal does not retroactively 
render processing based on consent unlawful, it prevents any further processing of personal 
data.163 Once consent is withdrawn, the controllers also have an obligation to erase such data, 
unless there is another purpose that justifies the processing.164 
Furthermore, the data subject should not suffer any detriment from the withdrawal as 
highlighted by Recital 42 of the GDPR. For example, withdrawing consent should not lead to 
any costs for the data subject or to a clear disadvantage. In addition, withdrawal of consent 
should be as easy as to give consent. According to the EDPB if consent for processing is 
obtained through a certain electronic user interface, consent should be able to be withdrawn 
through that same interface.165 
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3.5.3 Demonstrating consent 
According to Article 7(1) of the GDPR the controller needs to be able to demonstrate data 
subject’s consent. This is further clarified in Recital 42, which states that “where processing is 
based on the data subject's consent, the controller should be able to demonstrate that the data 
subject has given consent to the processing operation.” According to EDPB such an obligation 
also includes that the controller can show that the data subject was informed, and that the 
controller met all the criteria of valid consent.166 This obligation to demonstrate valid consent 
is in place as long as the processing activity in questions lasts.167 The purpose behind this 





















166 Ibid, 22-23.  
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid, 23.  
34 
 
4. Limitations of consent in the processing of personal data in IoT 
 
4.1 Rationale behind consent 
As we have seen, consent has been accorded great value in the European data protection 
framework. The current consent-based model is closely tied with the concept of information 
self-determination.169 The concept was made known by the German Constitutional Court in 
1983, which ruled in its famous decision on the constitutionality of the Census Act that the right 
of information self-determination is a constitutional fundamental right: “the fundamental right 
guarantees the authority conferred on the individual to, in principle, decide themselves on the 
disclosure and use of their personal data. Limitations of this right to “informational self-
determination” are only permissible if there is an overriding public interest”.170 The principle 
of information self-determination, as expressed by the German Constitutional Court, reflects 
the value of individual’s autonomy, ability to make choices and exercise control on his or her 
personal data.171 At the heart of this principle is consent, which is used as a means of the 
“participatory right of information self-determination”.172  
It is clear that the EU data protection framework has been influenced by information self-
determination. As we have seen, consent of the data subject has been given a prominent role in 
the GDPR and ePrivacy Directive. Consent is seen as an expression of free choice and is thus 
closely connected to the principle of autonomy.173 Moreover, the GDPR emphasizes the 
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importance of individuals’ control over their personal data.174 Such control is deemed to foster 
autonomy and empower individuals to manage their personal data.175  
Soleve has referred to the current approach to privacy regulation as privacy self-management.176 
According to him under this current approach a set of rights is given to individuals such as 
rights of i) notice of the upcoming collection and use of personal data and ii) choice whether to 
consent to such processing of their personal data.177 The purpose behind this set of rights is to 
give control to individuals over their personal data, and through this control individuals are 
expected to make privacy decisions based on costs-benefit analysis of the collection, disclosure 
and use of their data.178 However, the emphasis on control and consent has not turned out to 
have the desired effects.  
 
4.2 Problems with consent  
Despite the prominence of consent in European data protection, consent has faced a lot of 
criticism. The problems with consent are especially obvious in the digitalized world. It has even 
been argued that, in online context, consent is not a suitable approach to data processing.179 
This section will explore the academic critique towards consent and discuss the problems 
related to IoT.  
 
4.2.1 Problems with informed consent  
The emphasis on consent is premised on the fact that individuals are rational actors who are 
able to make the best decisions for themselves and to navigate the obscure digital and 
technological environment. However, this approach has been criticized by many. The most 
common line of criticism seems to center the notion of informed consent. Consent must be 
based on appropriate information; this is essential for the data subject “in order to enable them 
to make informed decisions, understand what they are agreeing to, and for example exercise 
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their right to withdraw their consent”.180 This transparency requirement is often implemented 
in the form of privacy notices. 
i) People do not read privacy notices 
The first critique addresses the fact that people do not tend to read privacy notices.181 Although 
an important part of privacy self-management are notices, they are often many pages long, 
legalistic and difficult for a regular person to understand.182 According to 2019 Eurobarometer, 
37% of respondents do not read privacy statements at all, citing the length and difficulty of 
understanding being the main reasons for not reading them.183  
Schermer, Custers and van der Hof have criticized the overemphasis on consent.184 According 
to them such overemphasis has led to an information overload.185 It has been estimated that it 
would take an average person 244 hours annually to read all the privacy notices he or she is 
being presented with.186 That would mean an average of 40 minutes per day. In addition, 
companies regularly modify their privacy policies, so one would also have to keep up with these 
changes in order to stay informed. This overload of information will overwhelm the recipient 
“causing her to skim, freeze, or pick out information arbitrary”.187 According to Schermer, 
Custers and van der Hof the issue with information overload is further aggravated when consent 
is asked in situations where individuals are making completely different decisions, such as 
online shopping or booking a holiday”.188 Because privacy notices are so common, people will 
become tired of these procedures that take them away from the fun and functionality of the 
service. In similar fashion, those eager to use a new IoT device may bypass privacy information 
and become bound to terms and conditions they have no knowledge of. Privacy protection then 
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becomes a tradeoff between “instant gratification… versus the abstract risks associated with 
the misuse or abuse of personal data”.189 
Moreover, according to Schermer, Custers and van der Hof there is an overload of consent 
transactions.190 In other words, there are simply too many consent requests and privacy notices 
presented to individuals. According to them this will negatively affect the psychological 
function of being presented with a consent transaction”.191 The need to avoid this kind of “user 
fatigue” has also been warned by the EDPB. According to the EDPB “in the digital context, 
many services need personal data to function, hence, data subjects receive multiple consent 
requests that need answers through clicks and swipes every day. This may result in a certain 
degree of click fatigue: when encountered too many times, the actual warning effect of consent 
mechanisms is diminishing”.192  
The result of these overloads is that consent questions and privacy notices are no longer read.193 
Further, Schermer, Custers and van der Hof argue that information and consent transaction 
overload will lead to “consent decentralization”.194 This means that individuals will no longer 
make active and informed choices when asked for a consent, but rather give consent every time 
consent is asked.195 This notion is  supported by behavioral economics according to which when 
consent requests are encountered too many times, the act of making an informed decision 
becomes costly.196 Thus, consenting becomes an automatic action where people rely on 
automatic impulses such as rules of thumb and heuristics rather than on conscious thinking.197 
This is a problem to the validity of informed consent.  
ii) People do not understand privacy notices  
Another argument that has been presented by scholars is that it is questionable whether people 
understand privacy notices. Privacy notices have been criticized of being inefficient as they are 
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not being read and are difficult for users to understand.198 According to Solove people have 
several cognitive problems that cause issues to privacy self-management.199 These cognitive 
problems negatively affect people’s ability to make informed and rational choices when it 
comes to consenting to different forms of collection, use and disclosure of their personal data.200 
Data protection activities can be hard to understand for an average person; however, Soleve 
points out that individuals are also uninformed about the data collected about them as they do 
not engage in privacy self-management.201 As highlighted above this could be due to multiple 
factors, the length of the notices and their difficulty being one of the commonly cited ones.202 
However, making the privacy policies shorter and easier to understand conflicts with fully 
informing people about the types of data being collected and the purposes of the processing.203 
According to Barocas and Nissenbaum this “transparency paradox” means that loss of 
complexity inevitably results to loss of specificity.204 People need to be provided with specific 
information to be able to make informed choices and simplified, plain-language notices cannot 
do this.205 
iii) Skewed decision making 
Second cognitive problem pointed out by Solove is that people lack the “expertise to adequately 
assess the consequences of agreeing to certain present uses or disclosures of their data”, even 
if they would read privacy notices.206 Although people regularly express in surveys how much 
they value and care about their privacy, people constantly disclose their data for very small 
benefits.207 This skewed decision making has also been called “privacy paradox”, where 
behavioral intentions are not reflected in the actual behavior.208 Soleve sees the skewed decision 
making as a result of individual’s cognitive capabilities and bounded rationality.209 According 
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to Calo privacy notices rely on false conception of rational consumer with limitless attention.210 
Behavioral economics have shown that human rationality is bounded. In other words, people 
struggle to apply their knowledge, solve problems and make informed choices in complex 
situations.211 Instead people often rely on simplified rules of thumb, mental models and 
heuristics.212 Such mental shortcuts can lead to behavior that goes against people’s self-
interest.213 For example, those possessing mental models on how a traditional computer 
operates, might completely misjudge how an IoT device functions.214 In addition, the 
complexity of IoT can make it difficult for users to  develop new and accurate mental models 
on how their devices function, what kind of information is being collected by their devices, and 
how their devices use and disclose information.215  
Further, according to Soleve people are more willing to disclose their personal data when they 
feel that they are in control, even if the control is illusory.216 People are often unaware of the 
nudging methods and manipulation pertaining to the design and layout of the user interfaces, 
and thus made believe they are in control, leaving the stakeholders free to engage in collection 
and other processing activities.217 This appears to be also true in terms of IoT. As Williams, 
Nurse and Creese state the novelty and functionality of IoT devices can divert user’s attention 
away from the large amounts of data they are disclosing.218 Moreover, as Rosner and Kenneally 
state, IoT devices are not neutral; they are manufactured by companies who benefit from the 
processing of data and thus are built with a commercial logic that encourages sharing of data.219 
iv) Problems with scale  
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In addition to the cognitive problems, Soleve points out that privacy self-management also faces 
structural problems.220 The first structural problem is the problem with scale.221 In other words, 
there are too many information actors processing personal data, making it impossible for a 
person to control and monitor these entities. Even if all these entities would provide individuals 
with notice and appropriate choice whether to consent to such processing, a regular person does 
not have enough time or resources to manage such entities.222 As we saw above, it would take 
an around 40 minutes per day to read all the relevant privacy policies an average individual 
faces. However, that 40 minutes does not take into account how long it would take to actually 
truly understand the policies. Moreover, managing the entities is difficult as the landscape of 
information actors working behind the scenes is constantly changing.223 For example, the entity 
that collects individual’s data might sell it to another entity or store it to servers managed by 
others.224 
v) Aggregation effect 
The second structural issue raised by Soleve is that even if people make rational choices with 
how they use their data, that data may be aggregated in the future in ways the person did not 
anticipate and reveal new information about the person in question.225 By analyzing existing 
information, the new information that can be deduced is so complex and evolving so quickly 
that people cannot assess the harms and benefits involved.226 This aggregation problem means 
that “it makes it nearly impossible to manage data”.227 Consenting to data collection, use and 
disclosure is something that can have future detriments and thus is something that should be 
assessed and decided far in advance. However, as Solove point out it is difficult to assess the 
harm as individuals are unable to predict what the harm could be down the road.228 In addition, 
this kind of cost-benefits analysis is difficult as people prefer immediate benefits.229 According 
to Borgesius people are influenced by biases such as the present bias, which suggests that 
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“people often choose for immediate gratification and disregard future costs and 
disadvantages”.230 
The aggregation effect is very much applicable to IoT. As IoT continues to grow and spread 
into human environments, more and more information will be collected. It has been estimated 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that in 2022 an 
average household of four, in an OECD member country, will have around 50 connected 
devices.231 When data is combined from just one IoT device or from various different IoT 
enabled sensors and devices, new inferences can be derived.232 Further, data that may seem 
simple or insignificant at the moment of disclosure to the data subject, may reveal complex and 
unexpected results when combined with other sources of data. It has been described by Peppet 
that this kind of sensor fusion leads to a world where “everything reveals everything on the 
Internet of Things”.233 This “everything” may also be sensitive personal data.  
In addition, aggregation can alter the identifiability of data. The WP29 has recognized that 
pseudonymized or even anonymized data risks being identified in IoT. 234 The large amounts of 
data collected by several different sensors and the fact that data is being processed automatically 
means that there is a limited possibility to remain anonymous in IoT. According to Peppet the 
reason why sensor data is particularly vulnerable to re-identification is because “sensor data 
capture such a rich picture of an individual, with so many related activities, that each individual 
in a sensor-based dataset is reasonably unique”.235  
 
4.2.2 Information asymmetries 
The problems presented above in section 4.2.1 are all examples of information asymmetries. 
Information asymmetry means that there are several knowledge gaps between data subjects and 
controllers; in other words, individuals do not know what the companies do with their data, thus 
undermining the basic notion of informed consent.236 It should be noted that the companies 
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processing the data do not face the same problems. As stated by Hoofnagle and Whittington 
“despite lengthy and growing terms of service and privacy, consumers enter into trade with 
online firms with practically no information meaningful enough to provide the consumer with 
either ex ante or ex post bargaining power. In contrast, the firm is aware of its cost structure, 
technically savvy, often motivated by high-powered incentives of stock values, and adept at 
structuring the deal so that more financially valuable assets are produced from consumers than 
consumers would prefer”.237  
The GDPR has tried to mitigate this problem by imposing transparency requirements to data 
controllers.238 However, according to Borgesius the information asymmetry is very hard to 
solve as transaction costs arise for individuals.239 As we saw reading privacy policies takes a 
lot of time. Furthermore, it is questionable can the data subjects understand the privacy policies 
as they are often long, ambiguous and difficult to read. Because data subjects do not read the 
privacy policies, or even access them, their understanding of the significance of the disclosure 
will most likely be very low.240  
Van de Waerdt has categorized the instances where information asymmetries arise into two 
categories: those which arise from personal data collection, and those arising from personal 
data analysis.241 The first instance where information asymmetries typically arise is when  
companies collect personal data through methods and quantities that an average person cannot 
simply comprehend, manage and monitor.242 As the WP29 states in regard to IoT “interaction 
between objects, between objects and individuals’ devices, between individuals and other 
objects, and between objects and back-end systems will result in the generation of data flows 
that can hardly be managed with the classical tools used to ensure the adequate protection of 
the data subjects’ interests and rights”.243 Furthermore, communication between devices and 
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transmission of data can be triggered automatically and by default, without human involvement, 
and without the user of the IoT device knowing about it.244 If the user is not aware of such 
automatic communication, it is very difficult for him or her to control the data flows.245 In 
addition, it will be even harder to control the subsequent use of that data, and thereby prevent 
function creep.246 Moreover, IoT is very fragmented. There are multiple stakeholders involved 
in IoT. These include for example device manufacturers, social platforms, application 
developers and other third parties.247 Taken into account all the IoT stakeholders and the 
complicated tangle of contracts and subcontracts between them, it is no wonder the flows of 
personal data are almost impossible for an average person to manage. 
The second instance where information asymmetries can arise is personal data analysis: “having 
previously collected a set of personal data from the consumer, data analysis is used to expand 
and enrich the dataset without requiring further involvement or knowledge of the data 
subject”.248 As discussed above, seemingly meaningless information generated by IoT devices 
and sensors can be combined and analyzed resulting in information that has value to the data 
controller. This is especially the case when data streams are combined into profiles.249 Such 
profiles can reveal information about the device user’s living patterns, habits and preferences 
and can thus constitute sensitive personal data. Although it is unclear to what extent and to what 
level of detail individuals are being profiled for example for targeted advertising, the fact that 
its extent is unknown functions as an indication of the information asymmetries present on the 
data-driven market.250 
 
4.2.3 Problems with freely given consent 
Another line of criticism has questioned whether consent can be considered freely given. Freely 
given consent implies that the data subject is able to exercise real choice and control regarding 
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the processing of his or her data.251 However, many scholars have shown that whenever data 
subjects are confronted with consent request, they often lack a real choice.    
vi) No room for negotiations 
First of all, according to Schermer, Custers and van der Hof people lack meaningful choice in 
online environments as many services function with a principle of take-it-or-leave-it.252 The 
same appears also to be true with IoT devices, which according to Rosner and Kenneally operate 
on “fire and forget it” basis.253 When confronted with a consent request people often have a 
choice to accept the terms of the privacy notice or not to use the product or service.254 The 
controllers do not offer any room for negotiation.255 According to Schermer, Custers and van 
der Hof the controllers lack an incentive to offer such room as their business model is based on 
personal data collection.256 However, if accepting the terms of a privacy notice is a precondition 
for using an IoT device, it is questionable can such consent be considered as freely given as the 
data subject was not able to exercise real choice. As Susser point out opting out is not often a 
realistic option as the cost of opting out is too high for the data subject.257  
As more and more “regular” devices such as watches and TVs become smart, it can become 
problematic if the device cannot be used without consenting to also personal data processing. 
As time goes on, people might be unable to buy products that are not smart.258 This can lead to 
an “erosion of choice”.259 Furthermore, according to WP29 “the possibility to renounce certain 
services or features of an IoT device is more a theoretical concept than a real alternative”.260 In 
other words, it might not be possible to disable the “connected” features of an IoT device and 
use it as a “regular” device where no personal data is collected. In addition, as smart devices in 
people’s homes become more common, so will smart devices in shared spaces such as cities 
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and retail stores.261 For example retail stores may place sensors inside and outside their stores 
to track the location of their customers to derive information about consumer behavior and 
travel.262 Thus, people may have to choose between entering a physical area and consenting to 
a processing of their personal data or not entering at all. 
Moreover, in order for an IoT device holder to access their data or to even use the functionalities 
of their device, they will often have to install a third-party application.263 Installing the 
application also means providing the app developer access to the data collected by the device.264 
Although such an application is usually installed on an opt-in basis265, not installing the 
application (and thus not providing access to data to the app developer) will most likely mean 
that the device owner will not be able to use the device as the app works as a primary interface 
through which the device can be managed.  
vii) No alternatives 
Koops has pointed out that not consenting to data processing is not an option as there are no 
privacy respecting alternatives on the market.266 The market has been taken over by tech giants 
such as Apple, Google and Amazon, and their partners. This means that if the device 
manufacturer’s privacy policy does not satisfy the device owner, there is a possibility that there 
is no alternative device yet on the market he or she could switch to.  
Article 20 of the GDPR provides a right to data portability. This means that the data subject has 
the right to receive their data from the controller and transmit that data to another controller 
making switching services easier. However, due to lack of standardization and interoperability 
in IoT, it could be that such option to switch services does not exist in practice. As WP29 states 
“the Internet of Things is sometimes seen as an “Internet of Things” in which every 
manufacturer has defined its own set of interferences and data format”.267 In other words, data 
is hosted in isolated silos making transferring of data from one device to another almost 
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impossible.268 WP29 has noted that device users do not often have an access to the raw data 
that are registered by their device.269 Getting access to such raw data would mean that the user 
would be able to transfer their data to another data controller.270 It thus seems that if device 
owners do not accept data controllers’ privacy policies, “these persons have in practice no other 
possibility than to stop using their devices as most data controllers do not provide such 
functionality [access to raw data] and provide access only to a degraded version of the stored 
raw data”.271 
viii) Dependency  
Related to the above points, it has been noted that people are becoming increasingly dependent 
on the usage of digital platforms and smart devices.272 For example Matzner et al. points out 
that smartphones have become so common that people who refuse to use them might face social 
costs such as “less contacts with friends, missing carrier opportunities, more complicated 
dating, being considered inefficient as a colleague, being considered suspicious at border 
controls, and many more”.273  
Moreover, Martzner et al. argue that through the use of online services, the users are able to 
obtain social gratifications.274 It has been noted by the WP29 that individuals are even more 
likely to use smart devices when they can share the data collected by their device with others 
on social platforms.275 According Martzner et al. sharing information online functions as 
relationship-building and leads to social acceptance.276 Thus, protecting one’s privacy becomes 
a balancing act between data protection and social gratification. However, as Martzner et al. 
note this balancing act assumes that users always have a choice whether to use the service or 
not.277 This is not always the case as in today’s world people will have to engage with certain 
services and products to achieve certain things e.g. keeping in touch with people, managing 
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their finances etc.278 As Nissenbaum states: “while it may seem that individuals freely choose 
to pay the informational price, the price of not engaging socially, commercially, and financially 
may in fact be exacting enough to call into question how freely these choices are made.”279  
 
4.2.4 Power asymmetries 
As we have seen above in section 4.2.3, it seems that there are some significant problems with 
freely given consent due to power asymmetries between data subjects and controllers. One of 
the cited reasons for this imbalance is that the digital market is characterized by the presence of 
tech “monopolies”.280 In practice, this means that dominant companies are able to exercise their 
power by imposing one-sidedly their practices on individuals.281 This calls into question the 
validity of freely given consent as the data subjects seldom are able to exercise real choice. For 
example, as Schrems argued in his complaint to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
“facebook.com has become a standard form of communication and that consent to a monopoly 
is hardly “free””.282 For dominant companies consent thus seems to be just a formality; 
something that is asked to ensure legal compliance.283 
According to Clifford, Graef and Valcke this imbalance of power has been enabled by the 
existence of economic characteristics such as network effects.284 Network effect mean that the 
more people use a product or a service the more valuable it will become often resulting to a 
winner-takes-it-all situation.285 Network effect thus leads to market concentration, where users 
have no choice or a very limited choice which product or service to use. Such network effect is 
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especially common with platforms.286 As consumer IoT platforms are characterized by 
interoperability, the effect of competing platforms is diminished.287 For example, FitBit, which 
is a wearable fitness tracker, is only usable in the FitBit platform. Market concentration and 
dominance leads to a situation where there is no incentive for the platforms to negotiate with 
their users.  According to Botta and Wiedemann if the market would be competitive and “well-
functioning”, platforms would have to negotiate with users and offer options for different 
privacy preferences.288 However, it is very difficult for competitors to enter the market due to 
the network effects. Further, as the dominant platforms already hold very large pools of data, it 
functions as “the single biggest barrier to entry in the digital economy”.289  
 
4.2.5 Notice and choice ill-fitting for IoT 
The notice and choice model has also been criticized as completely ill-fitting for IoT. The 
critique mainly addresses the design of IoT devices. First of all, IoT devices are often small and 
lack screens and input mechanisms such as keyboards or touch screen.290 This poses practical 
challenges for the notice and consent model as the devices do not facilitate consent. For 
example, a smart watch has a tiny screen, but a smart water meter does not have any input or 
output capabilities. This means that most IoT devices do not have any means to display privacy 
notices to their users.291 As a result, users will have to be informed through other channels such 
as through an associated mobile application, manufacturer’s website or a paper version in the 
device’s box.292 According to Peppet in most cases manufacturers prefer to display privacy 
related information in their website.293 In other words, this model assumes that once an 
individual buys an IoT device and brings it home, he or she will also go online through his or 
her smart phone or computer to read the privacy policy. However, according to a study 
conducted by Peppet privacy policies are hard to find as most IoT devices he studied did not 
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include even a mention of the existence of a privacy policy nor directed the user to 
manufacturer’s website.294 Moreover, if the user would be able to find the privacy policy of his 
or her device, research has shown that IoT privacy policies fail to provide appropriate 
information to consumers. According to a report by 2016 GPEN Sweep, a study by 25 data 
protection regulators around the world, 59% of IoT devices involved in the study failed to 
adequately explain to the customers how their personal information was collected, used and 
disclosed.295 Furthermore, 72% failed to explain to consumers how they could delete their 
information off the device.296 Consent will not be valid, if it is not specific and informed.   
The lack of screens also means that IoT devices do not provide a mechanism to obtain 
individual’s consent.297 Furthermore, in practice most devices are plug and play, meaning that 
users will be able to start using the device as soon as taken out of its box.298 This certainly raises 
questions about whether just a mere use of a device constitutes a clear affirmative action and 
thus a valid consent. Because of this plug and play model, users are not required to manually 
configure settings before use.299 However, the default settings tend not to provide optimal 
privacy and rely on the unawareness of individuals to support data collection.300 Although some 
devices provide an option to evaluate and customize their settings, most people do not deviate 
from the default settings.301  
Obtaining consent through classical mechanisms can also be hard due to the fact that IoT 
devices may process data that does not belong to the user or subscriber of the IoT device.302 For 
example, a smart car may collect data from its passengers.303 Such passengers will most likely 
have no idea that their data is being processed, as information may only be provided to the 
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owner of the car.304 Smart devices are also becoming increasingly common in shared spaces. 
For example, cities are installing information infrastructures such as traffic control sensors, 
smart lighting, smart transportation etc.305 This raises questions how people will be informed 
about the purposes of the processing of their personal data in such public spaces? Further, in 
such a situation how can an individual give a valid consent? It is clear that IoT in public places 
moves individuals beyond the “realm of control”.306 
A second issue with IoT is that it has been explicitly designed to be ubiquitous, unobtrusive and 
invisible.307 As Weiser stated already in 1991, technologies “weave themselves into the fabric 
of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it”.308 In practice, this means that 
individuals may not even be aware that they are surrounded by sensors that are processing their 
data. Such lack of information constitutes a significant problem to valid consent. WP29 has 
raised the issue with wearable devices such as smart watches. As it notes “most observers may 
not distinguish a normal watch from a connected one, when the latter may yet embed cameras, 
microphones and motion sensors that can record and transfer data without the individuals being 
aware of, and even less consenting to such processing”.309 This same problem applies also to 
shared spaces. While an individual may be able to decide what smart devices they place in their 
home, this control does not extend to shared places where smart devices are used by others.310 
That is to say, in shared spaces individuals will be exposed to IoT devices of other people such 
as smart watches, smart glasses and smart phones. As Leta Jones argues the notice and choice 
model is not available in the “internet of other people’s things”.311   
 
4.2.6 Summary of the problems 
As can be seen from the discussion above, the consent-based model has come under sustained 
criticism. It has been argued that in digitalized world consent does not offer individuals real 
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control, but rather an “illusion” of it.312 The critics have pointed out that in practice consent is 
neither freely given nor informed. The problems are summarized below. 
i) People do not read privacy notices: most people do not read privacy notices due to 
information overload and consent transaction overload. 
ii) People do not understand privacy notices: privacy notices are too long and difficult 
to understand. 
iii) Skewed decision making: human rationality is bounded, and individuals’ decision 
making is influenced by mental models and heuristics. Mental models can be 
inaccurate due to being based on false information or misplaced assumptions.  
iv) Problems with scale: There are too many entities providing privacy notices and 
consent requests, which makes privacy management difficult due to lack of time and 
resources. 
v) Aggregation effect: data that might have seemed insignificant may be combined with 
other data in the future revealing new and possibly sensitive information. 
vi) No room for negotiations: When confronted with a consent request people often 
have a choice to accept the terms of the privacy notice or not to engage with the 
device. 
vii) No alternatives: There are no privacy respecting alternatives on the market as the 
market is dominated by tech giants. The lack of standardization and interoperability 
in IoT makes it hard to switch service provider and/or device.  
viii) Dependency: Smart devices are becoming increasingly common, and users are 
becoming more and more dependent on such devices.  
The above-mentioned problems are examples of information and power asymmetries between 
data subjects and controllers. Such asymmetries invalidate consent; the value of user consent 
diminishes if users are not adequately informed, or they perceive to have no other choice but to 
accept the terms and conditions of a given product. 
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Moreover, the rise of IoT brings with itself a unique set of problems to the consent-based model. 
The design of IoT devices ads to the challenges presented above. IoT devices often lack screens 
and input mechanisms, and so users cannot easily access privacy notices, change default 
settings or provide consent. Most devices do not include privacy policies in their packaging, 
but rather privacy policies are displayed in manufacturer’s website or related mobile 
application. These practical challenges with notice and consent get even worse in shared spaces 
such as smart cities. The ubiquitous and invisible nature of IoT also brings with itself issues as 
individuals may be completely unaware that they are surrounded by sensors collecting data 
about them. Data processing does not always require human intervention as communication 
between objects can be triggered automatically and by default. Moreover, the data collected 
might not always belong to the user or subscriber of the device. In other words, it is hard to 
control whose data is being collected by IoT devices and to provide transparency. It might also 
not be possible to use IoT devices in a mode where data collection is disabled. The combination 
of lack of screens, the fact that people do not read or understand privacy notices and the 
ubiquitous nature of IoT means that individuals are often not aware what kind of data is 
collected about them and how that data will be used by the IoT stakeholders in the future. 
Furthermore, sensor data permits unexpected interferences to be drawn about individuals’ 













5. Alternative ways forward to consent based model 
This thesis has shown that the consent-based model is failing to provide adequate protection to 
data subjects in digital environments. As IoT continues to evolve and become more and more 
common, intertwining itself to our everyday lives, the problems with consent will arguably 
exacerbate. Those factors which are contributing to the current “privacy paradox”, such as 
skewed decision making, aggregation effect and scale, will only be aggravated with IoT.313 
However, if privacy self-management is not the answer, then what is?  
The most obvious alternative would be to disregard consent in digital environments. However, 
such approach appears too radical as consent, despite its problems, seems to function as a last 
line of defense against the loss of control of personal data. As Solove states “for all its flaws, 
privacy self-management should not be abandoned. Providing people with notice, access, and 
the ability to control their data is key to facilitating some autonomy in a world where decisions 
are increasingly being made about them with the use of personal data, automated processes, and 
clandestine rationales, and where people have minimal abilities to do anything about such 
decisions”.314 This thesis agrees. Furthermore, it is hard to see that consent could be completely 
set aside considering its “fundamental” role given by the Charter. The same applies to the notice 
and consent paradigm as Article 8 of the Charter expressly states that personal data “must be 
processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law”. Moreover, it has been argued that the absence 
of consent would make privacy framework too rigid and paternalistic.315 In light of this, the 
following two alternatives are discussed as the best ways forward. 
 
5.1 Improving consent 
What is clear is that most of the very critics of consent are not ready to revoke consent entirely, 
but rather to improve and complement it. Some scholars argue that there should be more 
substantive controls in place to what kind of processing individuals can consent to. For example, 
Solove proposes that the law should take a stronger stance about substance: “more substantive 
rules about data collection, use, and disclosure could consist of hard boundaries that block 
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particularly troublesome practices as well as softer default rules that can be bargained 
around”.316 However, one could argue that the European data protection framework already 
contains such substantive rules making Solove’s argument more relevant for the United States. 
For example, the GDPR has a stricter regime for special categories of data. Because of the 
sensitive nature of special categories of data and the privacy risks involved with using such 
data, Borgesius has proposed that the use of health related data should be completely prohibited 
in behavioral targeting regardless whether the data subject has given explicit consent.317 
Moreover, Borgesius sees that privacy self-management should learn from consumer law, 
which contains not only rules which empower individuals but also protection rules.318 For 
example, food labeling rules require companies to disclose comprehensive information to 
consumers about the content of food products empowering them to make decisions, while other 
consumer law rules protect consumers by banning for example certain food additives and 
placing minimum safety standards for products.319  
These kinds of rules that protect people by limiting their autonomy are examples of paternalism. 
Paternalism is seen by some as the preferred solution to the problems with consent. As 
acknowledges by Solove “consent performs an enormous amount of work. Activities that would 
otherwise be illegitimate are made legitimate by consent”.320 As seen above, this means in most 
instances that individuals do not engage in privacy self-management and end-up up giving over 
their personal data for very small benefits and agreeing to processing operations that might 
cause them harm in the long run. In light of this, some scholars have considered that law should 
regulate privacy in a more paternalistic manner. According to Allen privacy is a “foundational 
human good” that must in certain instances be mandated.321 Because of this foundational nature 
of privacy, “privacy cannot be left solely to the realm of waiver-eligible free choice”.322 In other 
words, law must override individual’s choice on some occasions.  Arguably the GDPR already 
includes some paternalistic provisions such as principles of fairness and purpose limitation as 
individuals cannot give away the protection offered by those principles.323 Moreover, the 
GDPR’s stringent conditions for valid consent could be seen as a form of paternalism. However, 
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as we have seen even the “stringent” requirements do not necessary lead to people making 
better decisions regarding their data. Although Solove proposes more substantive rules about 
data collection, he also (somewhat contradictory) believes that paternalistic regulation should 
be avoided as it takes away individuals’ autonomy and denies freedom to make choices.324 
Convincedly he argues that the correct choices about privacy are not always clear.325 As an 
example Solove uses a person suffering from an eating disorder who would like to share her 
experience online as a way of empowering herself. He argues that “if the law were to put 
restrictions on her disclosure, then it would be limiting her freedom and autonomy — ironically 
in the name of preserving her freedom and autonomy”.326  
Other scholars are focused on improving informedness of consent. According to van Alsenoy 
et al. despite the problems related to privacy notices, notices should not be abandoned as notices 
hold the “potential to fulfill an array of other functions, including the promotion of fairness, the 
reduction of knowledge asymmetries and the increase of accountability of data controller”.327 
Thus, many scholars seek to improve privacy notices. In order to achieve this, scholars are 
proposing innovative new ways to present privacy notices. These include shortening the notices 
or otherwise making the notices easier to understand, layering notices and visualizing notices 
with images and icons.328 However, as Calo states it does not matter how short or visual notices 
are, if no one reads them.329 Therefore, Calo proposes the use of visceral notices.330 Rather than 
using traditional long text formats, visceral notices attempt to convey awareness of data 
collection through design, without conveying information with text or symbols.331 An example 
of visceral notices is an interactive avatar that speaks or moves while the user moves on the 
screen.332 By building the notice as part of the experience, would mean that users are not 
required to leave the fun and functionality of the service or required to click anything.333  
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Visceral notices could be seen as a form of nudges. A nudge is “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives”.334 In the last years the idea of “nudging” 
people into better privacy decisions has gained popularity.335 The idea is to design systems so 
that they guide and influence individuals’ choices encouraging privacy protective behavior.336 
Although meant to empower individuals, nudges are also a form of soft paternalism.337  
However, according to Acquisti such system would not take away individuals’ freedom, but 
rather offer them option of more informed choices.338  
With nudges comes also some ethical concerns. Is it right that individuals’ behavior is directed 
in such a way? However, as Acquisti et al. argue every design choice, whether intentional or 
not, will affect users’ behavior.339 Moreover, design choices are already influencing the way 
we interact with systems. Most of the time individuals are completely unaware of the nudging 
methods pertaining to the design and layout of the user interfaces, leaving the companies free 
to engage in collection and other processing activities. However, taken into account how nudges 
may affect user’s choice, it would be important that nudges are subject to an oversight 
mechanism. Furthermore, Calo acknowledges that one possible drawback about visceral notices 
is that when compared to written text they contain “less actionable information”.340 Thus, the 
problem with these proposed models of notices, whether simplified or visceral, is that the 
transparency paradox remains. Making the notices “simpler” conflicts with the notion of 
informed consent where people are fully aware about the consequences of giving up data.  
According to Susser the bar of informed consent is extremely high.341 To resolve the 
transparency paradox presented above, Susser proposes that notice and consent should be 
decoupled.342 This would allow to take the burden off notice. Susser persuasively states that 
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“while it’s true, then, that privacy disclosures can’t facilitate the level of understanding required 
for informed consent, the level of understanding they can facilitate is still valuable”.343 In some 
instances a lesser degree of understanding could be enough as the exhaustive privacy policies 
are not helping to achieve truly informed consent.344 Thus, if informed consent is no longer a 
requirement, new designs could be developed such as visceral forms of notice. Another rather 
compelling design option proposed by Ciocchetti is a privacy label on the model of food 
nutrition labels.345  
By seeking new and better ways to convey information to individuals, this approach aims to 
find a way to solve the information asymmetries present between data subjects and controllers. 
This thesis believes that improving the informedness of consent could be done by lowering the 
bar for informed consent as suggested by Susser. This thesis especially believes that nutrition 
labels for privacy would be a good idea. To begin, Europeans are accustomed to information 
being presented in such a way, as EU requires majority of packaged food to bear nutrition 
labels.346 Secondly, such notices would allow companies to focus on the content of their privacy 
notices as well as to the design. It also seems that privacy labels could become a new standard 
as Apple has required apps to add privacy nutrition labels since the end of 2020.347 Such labels 
will present the user with information about what data the app can access and what data the app 
will collect such as location data, browsing history, contact info etc.348 Finally, as has been 
discussed in this thesis, there are some unique problems when it comes to smart devices and 
privacy notices. As Peppet states “sensor-device firms seem stuck in a notice paradigm designed 
for websites rather than connected consumer goods”.349 Instead of presenting privacy policies 
 
343 Ibid, 57 [emphasis included in the original text].  
344 Ibid, 49.  
345 See Corey A. Ciocchetti, ’The Future of Privacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information 
Practices’ (2008) 26(1) The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law 1. 
346 See Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the 
provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 
of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council 
Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 
608/2004 [2011] OJ L 304. 
347 Ian Carlos Campbell, ‘Apple will require apps to add privacy ‘nutrition labels’ starting December 8th’ (The 
Verge, 5 November 2020) <https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/5/21551926/apple-privacy-developers-
nutrition-labels-app-store-ios-14> accessed 4 October 2021; Melanie Weir, ‘What are Apple’s Privacy Nutrition 
Labels? Here’s what you need to know about the new App Store feature that prioritizes user privacy’ (Business 
Insider, 20 January 2021) <https://www.businessinsider.com/what-are-apple-privacy-nutrition-
labels?r=US&IR=T> accessed 4 October 2021. 
348 Campbell (n 347) 
349 Peppet (n 47) 147. 
58 
 
in their websites, device manufacturers could include a privacy nutrition label in the box of the 
IoT device.  
However, improving the informedness of consent fails to account for the reality of screenless 
technologies. Nudges and visceral notices, for example, are designed for traditional screens. 
Although such nudges could be provided through a device application, it is questionable can an 
app be downloaded for everything (and more importantly is it meaningful). If we consider that 
an average household soon has 50 IoT devices, managing such a scale of apps could prove to 
be difficult. Furthermore, improving informedness of consent does not solve the issue with 
“internet of other people’s things”. Moreover, the discussion centering the informedness of 
consent only tries to solve the issue with informed consent. It does not explain how to reconcile 
the problems with freely given consent.  
 
5.2 Shifting the focus away from consent 
The emphasis on control and consent puts the responsibility on individuals as the ultimate 
decision makers. However, this places a significant burden on data subjects.350 Therefore, some 
scholars have proposed that in the age of big data the emphasis placed on consent should be 
reduced.351 This could be done by shifting the burden on companies.352 According to Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier most of data’s value lies in its secondary uses; therefore more emphasis 
should be placed on holding data controllers accountable for what they do with the data.353 In 
this model, companies would have to assess the secondary use of data based on the impact it 
would cause to the data subject.354 Due to the information asymmetries companies know much 
more about the purposes of the processing of a particular set of data and how they intend to use 
it. As Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier  argue it makes sense that companies bear the burden of 
responsibility as they are also the ones to benefit from the secondary uses of individuals’ data.355 
Moreover, Tene & Polonetsky see that by shifting the burden from individuals to companies, 
online privacy will become part of their corporate governance.356 According to them this would 
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make companies integrate privacy into products and business processes rather than focusing on 
writing extensive privacy notices.357  
However, it should be noted that the GDPR already places responsibility on controllers. 
Controllers’ responsibilities are laid down in Article 24 of the GDPR, which is complemented 
by Article 25. Moreover, the GDPR includes an accountability principle which provides that 
controllers shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure and to 
be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with the Regulation.358 The 
Regulation requires that personal data is i) processed lawfully, fairly and transparently, ii) 
collected for specific purposes (purpose limitation), iii) adequate, relevant and limited to what 
is necessary (data minimization), iv) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date (accuracy), 
v) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary 
(storage limitation), and vi) processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of personal 
data (integrity and confidentiality).359 
Shifting the burden of on companies has also been considered in relation to the ePrivacy 
Regulation. In 2020 the Croatian Presidency of the European Council proposed changes to the 
proposed ePrivacy Regulation. One of the key changes was the introduction of legitimate 
interest as a legal basis, in addition to consent, to process metadata and collect information from 
a terminal equipment.360 Although legitimate interest as a ground for processing electronic 
communications data has been removed during the German Presidency361, the Croatian 
Presidency’s proposal is a notable step away from consent.  
According to Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR processing of personal data is lawful if “processing 
is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, 
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject 
is a child”. Legitimate interest thus places responsibility on the controller to justify the 
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processing and the impact of the processing on individuals. The legitimate interest ground 
contains a three-stage test for the ground to be applicable. First of all, the purpose test requires 
that there is an existence of a legitimate interest.362 Secondly, the necessity test requires that the 
processing of personal data is necessary for those legitimate interest to be achieved.363 Lastly, 
the balancing test dictates that the interest of the controller or a third party must be balanced 
against the impact of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual whose data is being 
processed.364  
Some have seen the Croatian Presidency’s proposal as a welcomed step due to the shortcomings 
of consent.365 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership (CIPL) has for example criticized 
the overemphasis of consent in the proposed ePrivacy Regulation and the exclusion of other 
grounds for processing.366 According to them “the over-reliance on consent will have the 
unintended consequence of undermining the GDPR, as well as legitimate, necessary and 
beneficial processing of data and business practices within the Digital Single Market”.367 In 
their view consent should be used only in situations where there is a high risk for individual’s 
privacy that cannot be alleviated and in situations where the end user can be provided with 
meaningful information and choices.368 In other instances, the ePrivacy Regulation should 
recognize legitimate interest as an available ground for processing according to CIPL.369 
However, the EDPB has not supported the idea. For example, the Croatian Presidency’s 
proposal contradicts with the EDPB’s statement delivered in 2018 according to which “there 
should be no possibility under the ePrivacy Regulation to process electronic communications 
 
362 ICO, ‘How do we apply legitimate interest in practice?’ < https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-
protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/legitimate-interests/how-do-we-apply-
legitimate-interests-in-practice/> accessed 15 October 2021. 
363 Ibid.  
364 Ibid.  
365 For example, Eduardo Ustaran, Hogan Lovells Privacy and Cybersecurity Practice Global Co-Head, believes 
that “after so many years of flawed cookie consent, it is a productive thing to do to introduce another approach 
into the legislative debate. My view is that ‘legitimate interests’ is misunderstood and underrated as a 
regulatory mechanism to protect our privacy” in Jennifer Baker, ‘Critics on Croatia’s ePrivacy proposal: 
Legitimate interest provisions not legitimate’ (IAPP, 25 February 2020) <https://iapp.org/news/a/critics-on-
croatias-eprivacy-proposal-legitimate-interest-provisions-not-legitimate/> accessed 15 October 2021. 
366 CIPL, ‘Recommendation for Implementing Transparency, Consent and Legitimate Interest under the GDPR’ 
(19 May 2017) 15  < 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_recommendations_on_transparen
cy_consent_and_legitimate_interest_under_the_gdpr_-19_may_2017-c.pdf> accessed 15 October 2021. 
367 CIPL, ‘Comments on the Proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation’ (11 September 2017) 3 < 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_comments_on_the_proposal_for_
an_eprivacy_regulation_final_draft_11_september_2017.pdf> accessed 15 October 2021. 
368 Ibid.  
369 Ibid.  
61 
 
content and metadata based on open-ended grounds, such as ‘legitimate interests’, that go 
beyond what is necessary for the provision of an electronic communications service”.370  
According to the Croatian Presidency’s proposal the end-user’s interests shall be deemed to 
override the interests of the service or network provider when the service provider processes, 
stores or collects data to build an individual profile of the end-user and when the information 
or metadata contains special categories of personal data.371 Although it is good that the sensitive 
nature of special categories of data has been considered, the proposal does not acknowledge the 
sensitive nature of metadata. Although a piece of metadata would not contain special categories 
of personal data at the moment of collection, that does not mean that it would not reveal 
sensitive information about an individual over time.  
It is difficult to see how shifting burden from individuals to companies would work taken into 
account how much commercial value data holds to them. Data has been said to be the oil of the 
21st century – a raw material on which companies and even economies are being built on.372 
Further, as Joergensen notes, trusting companies’ accountability seems “overly optimistic” as 
in the modern age harvesting personal data functions as the core of many companies’ business 
model.373 In today’s world, a lot of data collection happens in a position of power and 
information asymmetry. Although this thesis agrees that companies may be better placed to 
assess the impact of the processing and to implement appropriate mitigations and safeguards, 
this would tip the scale almost completely to companies’ side. For example, introducing a 
legitimate interest ground to the ePrivacy regulation would lead to even lesser degree of control 
by the user than they currently have under ePrivacy Directive. Furthermore, according to Koops 
the current system already places too much faith in controller action.374 He argues that even 
though controllers would want to follow data protection law, the current system is so complex 
that controllers will blindly follow the rules without actually understanding much of data 
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protection.375 As he describes, this will “not lead to data protection law being a dead letter, as 
the letters are (at best) obediently followed, but it will result in the law being a zombie: it seems 
to live, but lacks vital spirit”.376 
In order to accommodate the challenges of IoT, many scholars are turning to privacy by design, 
which has been praised “as the best way forward for the failure of ‘traditional’ consent”.377 The 
WP29 has for example stated that “every stakeholder in the IoT should apply the principles of 
Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default”.378 The core idea here is to embed privacy into the 
design and engineering processes of smart devices as well as to business practices of the 
stakeholders. This would free individuals from bearing the burden of data protection as personal 
data would be automatically protected for example in any device and application. According to 
Cavoukian privacy by design should include seven principles: i) proactive rather than reactive, 
ii) the default settings of a device or a service should be set to a level that provide maximum 
privacy iii) embed privacy into the solution design and architecture of a device or a service, iv) 
full functionality – positive-sum, not zero-sum meaning that there should be no unnecessary 
trade-offs where individuals have to choose between seemingly contradicting options such as 
privacy and security, but rather all legitimate interests should be accommodated, v) provide full 
lifecycle protection, vi) establish visibility and transparency, and vii) respect user privacy and 
keep it user-centric.379 
Privacy by design and default are already put into law in Article 25 of the GDPR. According to 
Article 25(1) controller shall implement appropriate technical and organizational measures 
which are designed to implement the data protection principles and to integrate the necessary 
safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements and protect the rights and 
freedoms of data subjects. Moreover, Article 25(2) stipulates that controller shall implement 
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appropriate technical and organizational measures, by default, to ensure that only necessary 
personal data is processed. Privacy by design thus reflects an accountability requirement for 
controllers.380 The introduction of accountability represents a paradigm shift in data protection: 
“something which has traditionally been construed of in engineering terms as a ‘non-functional’ 
requirement—a matter of providing information to people (e.g., via terms and conditions or 
privacy notices)—is shifting under GDPR into a ‘functional’ requirement and something that 
must, therefore, be built into the IoT”.381  
Such privacy by design solutions could include for example restricting the amount of data 
collected by sensors to minimum, anonymizing personal data (as we saw there are, however, 
some difficulties to this when it comes to IoT), implementing better ways to provide privacy 
notices and designing user-friendly privacy settings.382 Although privacy by design solutions 
seem especially attractive in terms of IoT considering the lack of screens, opacity of data flows 
and “internet of other people’s things”, the GDPR does not specify or provide clear guidance 
on how such solutions should be implemented in practice or what such solutions should look 
like. As Urquhart et al. puts it “GDPR is ‘technologically neutral’, it offers no insight to 
‘systems designers’ as to how to build accountability into the technological ecosystem generally 
or into the IoT specifically”.383 Due to this vagueness of privacy by design and default, it comes 
as no surprise that there have been some troubles putting the policy into practice.384  
First of all, engineers do not have a detailed understanding of data protection requirements and 
lack the tools to make privacy by design a reality. As Birnhack et al. argue “whereas for lawyers 
PbD [privacy by design] seems an intuitive and sensible policy tool, for information systems 
developers and engineers it is anything but intuitive as it goes against the grain of several well-
established principles of information systems engineering”.385 Raising the engineers’ and 
designers’ awareness of law is therefore important. However, it may not be enough. It has been 
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pointed out by Urquhart that the whole concept of privacy is contested.386 Engineers and 
developers are required to implement rather abstractive concept into practice, while users of 
IoT devices are providing them with limited guidance due to the privacy paradox and the law 
does not specify what is required from them in practice.387 Lastly, Edwards has argued that 
privacy by design does not work well with fact that data holds such value to companies.388 In 
other words, although there is a regulatory incentive to adopt privacy protecting features to IoT 
devices, there may not be enough economic incentive to do so. This thesis agrees. However, 
this argument could be contested as the national data protection authorities are starting to fine 
companies for non-compliance of the principle. For example, in 2019 a German real estate 
company was fined 14,5 million euros for not implementing privacy by design.389 However, 
considering all the arguments above it seems rightful to state that “encoding data protection 
requirements in software or hardware shows that this is much easier said than done”.390  
 
5.3. Summary of the alternative ways forward 
The above discussion shows that the very critics of consent are not ready to entirely abandon 
consent. However, it is clear that the current consent model in failing in digital environments. 
An alternative way forward is thus needed. From the discussion above, two alternative ways 
can be distinguished:  
i) Improving consent 
ii) Shifting the focus away from consent 
The first alternatives presented focus on improving consent. While some scholars and authors 
have focused on putting in place more substantive rules that prohibit certain troublesome 
practices, most have focused on improving the informedness of consent. These ideas have 
centered around new ways to present privacy notices. These include making the notices shorter 
or otherwise easier to understand, layering notices and presenting notices in more visual ways 
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such as with images and icons. With the rise of behavioral research, scholars have also explored 
the use of nudges and visceral notices. Although this thesis sees improving informedness of 
consent as an important goal, it also recognizes that this approach fails to take into account the 
realities of screenless technologies. Most of the alternatives proposed here thus seem more 
suitable for improving website user’s consent, rather than smart device users. It is also important 
to recognize that improving the informedness of consent only attempts to solve issues relating 
to informed consent. However, it does not present a solution for the problems of freely given 
consent. In other words, improving the informedness of consent attempts to solve information 
asymmetries between data subjects and controllers, but fails to take into account the power 
asymmetries also present.    
The second line of alternatives take a step away from consent. The consent model places much 
responsibility on individuals. However, as we have seen individuals are not always apt to take 
on such responsibility. Thus, some critics of consent have proposed that the burden of data 
protection should be shifted on companies. This thesis argues that companies may be better 
placed to assess the impact of the processing and to implement appropriate mitigations and 
safeguards, however, it also questions whether shifting the responsibility to companies would 
work in practice taken into account the huge commercial value data holds.  
One way of shifting the burden of data protection to companies is privacy by design and default. 
Privacy by design and default aims to embed privacy into the design and engineering process 
of the smart device as well as to business practices of the stakeholders. Privacy by design places 
an accountability requirement for controllers. The introduction of accountability represents a 
paradigm shift in data protection. Companies are not only required to provide privacy 










IoT has become part of individuals’ everyday lives. As sensor embedded devices become more 
and more common, so will privacy concerns, as these devices have a capacity to collect data in 
an unprecedented scale. This thesis has shown that the data collected by these smart devices 
will most likely qualify as personal data as defined in the GDPR. Moreover, it has been 
established that large amounts of data collected by IoT devices can, in many instances, 
constitute sensitive personal data that reveal information such as racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, health and religion of the individual concerned.  
The protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data is a fundamental 
right. Therefore, in accordance with the GDPR processing of personal data is allowed only 
under a number of legal bases one of which is consent. In order for consent to be valid it must 
be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes. 
Consent also plays a central role in the ePrivacy Directive, where the processing of electronic 
communications content and metadata as well as storing or accessing information already stored 
in user’s or subscriber’s device is only possible with consent.391 In the European data protection 
framework consent thus functions as a key element of data protection. Its widespread use 
implies that it is the most common standard of legitimacy for the processing of personal data. 
Consent is closely tied with the notions of information self-determination and privacy self-
management, where individuals are granted the control of their personal data and through this 
control, they are expected to make privacy decisions based on costs-benefit analysis of the use 
of their personal data. However, this thesis has shown that this kind of privacy-self management 
is not working.  
This thesis has examined the problems related to consent in IoT. This thesis has shown that in 
practice consent is neither freely given nor informed. The problems with informed consent stem 
from the information asymmetries between individuals and companies. These asymmetries 
arise from personal data collection and analysis as individuals are not aware of what data is 
collected from them, how that data is being used and what inferences can be derived from that 
data, consequently calling into question the validity of informed consent. IoT only worsens this 
asymmetry as smart devices are designed to be ubiquitous and function unobtrusively. 
 
391 ePrivacy Directive excludes the other grounds for processing. However, these operations are possible with 
consent or if they meet one of the exceptions offered by the ePrivacy Directive such as transmission of a 
communication over an electronic communication network. 
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Furthermore, communication between IoT devices may be triggered automatically, making it 
almost impossible for individuals to manage their personal data. The GDPR tries to mitigate 
the information asymmetry through transparency requirement, which often manifests itself 
through privacy notices and policies. However, this thesis has shown that privacy notices are 
often too long and legalistic making them difficult to understand; resulting to a situation where 
notices are not read.  
The problems with freely given consent arise from power asymmetries between individuals and 
companies. In practice, this means that dominant companies are able to exercise their power by 
one-sidedly imposing their practices on individuals. This undermines the basic notion of freely 
given consent as data subjects are not able to exercise real choice. As IoT devices become 
increasingly common, users will become increasingly dependent on smart devices. It is thus 
problematic, if individuals are forced to engage with challenging practices, where there is no 
room for negotiation. Moreover, in many cases switching devices or service provider may not 
be a viable option as IoT is characterized by lack of standardization and interoperability.  
IoT also brings with itself a unique set of problems as most IoT devices lack screens and input 
methods making it hard for individuals to access privacy notices and provide consent. The 
unobtrusive and ubiquitous nature of IoT makes data collection activities invisible. Users are 
often unaware of the sensors surrounding them and the data collection processes taking place, 
thus questioning the existence of meaningful consent. As smart devices are becoming more and 
more common in shared spaces such as stores and public transportation, it also raises questions 
how people will be informed about the purposes of the processing of their personal data. 
Further, in such a situation how can an individual give a valid consent. Moreover, IoT devices 
such as wearable fitness trackers do not only collect information about their user, but also from 
people around them. It is difficult to see how the notice and consent model could be an option 
in “internet of other people’s things”. The shift from mere smart devices into entire smart 
environments, moves individuals beyond the realm of control.   
The problems with consent are worrisome. As IoT continues to evolve and become more and 
more common in human environments such as in the domestic and consumer world, the 
problems with consent will only exacerbate. Due to this, there is a need to rethink alternatives 
to the dominant consent approach. However, this thesis argues that consent should not be 
completely abandoned as consent still holds value to individuals’ autonomy. Moreover, it is 
hard to see that consent could be completely set aside considering its fundamental role given 
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by the Charter. In light of this, this thesis distinguishes two alternative ways forward: improving 
consent and shifting the focus away from consent. 
Due to the information asymmetries plaguing consent, many scholars have focused on 
improving the informedness of consent. In order to achieve this, scholars are proposing 
innovative new ways to present privacy notices. These include making notices shorter or 
otherwise easier to understand, layering notices and making notices visual with images and 
icons. Others have focused on nudging people to better privacy behavior through design. 
Although this thesis believes that such approaches are important in mitigating the information 
asymmetry, it is also questionable does this approach cater for the challenges of screenless IoT 
devices. Moreover, improving the informedness of consent does not provide a solution for the 
power asymmetries present between data subjects and controllers.  
The emphasis on control and consent puts the responsibility on individuals as the ultimate 
decision makers. This places a significant burden on data subjects. In order to reduce the burden 
of individuals, the focus should be shifted away from consent. Several scholars and practitioners 
have proposed that the burden of data protection should be placed more on companies. Due to 
information asymmetries, this thesis argues that companies may be better placed to assess the 
impact of their data processing and to implement appropriate mitigations and safeguards. This 
thesis sees privacy by design and default, a new normative requirement introduced by the 
GDPR, especially attractive in terms of IoT. Privacy by design and default aims to embed 
privacy into the design and engineering process of the smart devices as well as to business 
practices of stakeholders. Privacy by design shifts the responsibility of data protection to 
companies and places an accountability requirement for controllers.  
This thesis, however, questions whether shifting the responsibility to companies works in 
practice taken into account the commercial value data holds and the fact that some companies 
have built their entire business model around personal data. Data has even been labeled as the 
new oil of the 21st century. Thus, trusting companies’ accountability seems overly optimistic. 
Moreover, considering the power asymmetry that already exists between data subjects and 
controllers, one has to question whether it is desirable to further decrease individuals’ control.  
To conclude, this thesis has painted a troubling picture of consent as a tool to exercise control 
over one’s personal data in digital environments. Not only is IoT exacerbating the existing 
problems with consent, but also creating new ones as the diminishment of private spaces. 
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Therefore, it seems fair to state that the current model of consent is not adequate to respond to 
the evolving technological reality. If new alternative ways that complement individuals’ 
autonomy but also assert control over smart devices and data flows cannot be found, our society 
risks of destroying the concept of privacy and turning into a surveillance society. Therefore, 
more research is needed in the field of IoT and data protection. Although IoT is already very 
much present in our everyday lives, much of the research is still stuck on studying data 
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